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Abstract 
 
This  paper  studies  the  dynamic  interactions and  the  spillovers that exist  among  patent application intensity, 
secret innovation  intensity  and stock returns of a well-defined technological cluster  of firms.  We study  the differ- 
ential behavior when there  is an Innovation Leader (IL) and the rest of the firms are Innovation Followers (IFs). 
The leader and the followers of the technological cluster  are defined according to their patent innovation  activity 
(stock of knowledge).  We use data  on stock returns and patent applications of a panel of technologically  related 
firms of the United States  (US) economy over the period 1979 to 2000. Most firms of the technological cluster are 
from the pharmaceutical-products industry.  Interaction effects and spillovers are quantified  by applying  several 
Panel  Vector  Autoregressive  (PVAR) market  value  models.  Impulse  Response  Functions (IRFs)  and  dynamic 
interaction multipliers  of the  PVAR  models are estimated.  Secret  patent innovations  are estimated by using a 
recent  Poisson-type  patent count  data  model, which includes  a set of dynamic  latent variables.   We show that 
firms’ stock returns, observable  patent intensities  and  secret  patent intensities  have significant  dynamic  inter- 
action  effects for technologically  related  firms.  The  predictive  absorptive  capacity  of the  IL is the  highest  and 
this type of absorptive  capacity  is positively  correlated with  good firm performance  measures.   The  innovation 
spillover  effects that exist  among  firms,  due  to  the  imperfect  appropriability of the  returns of the  investment 
in R&D,  are specially important for secret  innovations  and  less relevant for observed innovations.  The  flow of 
spillovers between followers and the leader is not symmetric  being higher from the IL to the IFs. 
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1. Introduction
During the past decades, innovations protected by patents have played a key role in business strategies.
This fact motivated several studies about the determinants of patents and the impact of patents on
innovation, firm value and competitive advantage. Five are the usual main motives for firms to patent
their inventions: protection from imitation, blocking competitors, technological image and reputation,
exchange potential in cooperations and as an internal firm R&D performance indicator. Patents help
sustaining competitive advantages by increasing the production cost of competitors, by signaling a
better quality of products and by serving as barriers to entry. If patents are rewards for innovation,
more Research and Development (R&D) should be reflected in more patent applications, but this is
not the end of the story.
There is empirical evidence showing that patents through time are becoming easier to get and are
more valuable to the firm due to increasing damage awards from infringers. Shapiro (2007) notes that
patents are playing an increasingly important, and shifting, role in the United States (US) economy:
“There is evidence that firms in a number of industries adjusted their strategies in the 1980s and
early 1990s in response to changes in the patent system. They began seeking more patents, but not
necessarily because they were devoting more resources to R&D” (Shapiro, 2007). The observed increase
in the R&D efficiency through the 90’s could be due to increases in R&D differentiation, the increase
in the number of research fields and technologies and the use of more sophisticated patent strategies
due to the increases in competitive pressure through time. Jaffe (1999) mentioned that a multiplicity
of explanatory factors flows in and therefore the individual contribution of each must remain unclear.
These findings motivate us to study the determinants of patents and the dynamic interdependence
among observed patent intensity, secret innovation intensity and stock returns. We do that by using new
Poisson-type count panel data models and Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) econometric models,
which control for variables that are observed by the firms but unobserved for the econometrician (latent
variables).
The present paper builds on the patent-firm data set and some results of Blazsek and Escribano
(2010).1 The database applied includes 4,476 companies from several manufacturing and services
1 Application of patent data is motivated by Griliches (1990), who states that the main advantages of patent data are
the following: (a) by definition patents are closely related to inventive activity; (b) patent documents are objective since
they are produced by an independent patent office and their standards change slowly over time; and (c) patent data are
widely available in several countries, over long periods of time, and cover almost every field of innovation.
2
industries of the US economy for the period 1979 to 2000. Firms of the data set are classified into
different technological clusters, where each group includes technologically related firms. We focus on
a specific cluster of 111 firms. Most of these firms are in the SIC283 drugs product-market sector.2
Nevertheless, some companies of the technological cluster belong to other product-market sectors, for
example, the computers, chemicals or food industries; see Tables 1 and 2.
The objective of this paper is to learn about the dynamic interaction between patent innovation
leaders and patent innovation followers of the technological cluster, by allowing for the presence of
secret patent innovations. Secret patent innovations are identified by using a recent Poisson-type
patent count data model of Blazsek and Escribano (2010), which includes a set of dynamic latent
variables. This patent count data model is estimated by the Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL)
method, employing the Efficient Importance Sampling (EIS) variance reduction technique of Richard
and Zhang (2007).
In the technological cluster analyzed, the permanent Innovation Leader (IL) and the permanent
Innovation Followers (IFs) in patent innovation activity are identified. Interaction effects are quantified
by applying PVAR specifications to several market value models, estimated by the Quasi Maximum
Likelihood (QML) method. Moreover, the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) and the dynamic mul-
tipliers of the PVAR model are also estimated in order to have more precise information on dynamic
interaction effects.
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. The relevant literature is reviewed in
Section 2. The data set and the definitions of patent innovation leaders and followers are given in
Section 3. Description of the econometric models and summary of the empirical results are provided in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes. Statistical inference procedures of the econometric models are presented
in Appendices 1-4.
2. Innovation, competition and market value of firms
In this section, the relevant literature is summarized, relating innovation and R&D with competition
and with the market value of firms. The positive differential market value effects between the firms
that are innovation leaders and those that are followers are reviewed.
2 Standard Industry Classification (SIC)
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2.1. Innovation and market value
Innovation activity exists since it has a positive impact on the future cash flow and the current value
of a company, which motivates owners to promote innovative activity within their firm. As profits
on R&D are usually realized during several years in the future, current accounting based net profit
is a rather noisy measure of R&D benefits. Therefore, in the economics literature, several papers
have investigated the impact of R&D on stock market price, which avoids the problem of timing
differential of R&D expenses and the associated future cash flow to equity, since current stock prices
are determined by a forward-looking perspective of investors. This approach is also useful for the
consideration of different measures of R&D activity that may capture econometrically observable and
latent innovations, for example patents and trade secrets, respectively, as investors may be aware of
R&D related information hidden from the researcher.
Griliches (1981) constructs a stock of knowledge variable from lagged R&D expenses and the number
of patents. He finds a significant positive relationship between market value, R&D expenditure and
number of patents for a panel of large US firms for the period 1968 to 1974.
Pakes (1985) focuses on the dynamic relationships among the firm’s number of successful patent
applications, R&D expenditures and stock market value. Pakes concludes that the events that lead the
market to reevaluate the firm are significantly correlated with unpredictable changes in both the R&D
and the patents of the firm.
Hall (1993) uses data on US manufacturing firms for the period 1979 to 1991, finding that the stock
market valuation of R&D broke down in the mid-1980s.3
Lev and Sougiannis (1996) estimate the inter-temporal relation between R&D capital and stock
returns of public firms in the US during the period 1975 to 1991. These authors show that R&D capital,
defined as the weighted sum of past R&D expenses, is associated with subsequent stock returns.4
Blundell et al (1999) employ US firm-level panel data for the period 1972 to 1982. They examine
the relationship between surprise innovations and firm performance by using a dynamic panel count
data specification. The stock of innovation is constructed from a count of ‘technologically significant
and commercially important innovations’ commercialized by the firm. They find a positive impact of
innovation on market value.
3 Hall et al (2006) have similar findings.
4 See also Lev et al (2005).
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Chan et al (2001) investigate the relationship between R&D capital and stock returns of US firms
for the period 1975 to 1995. They define R&D capital, based on the estimates of Lev and Sougiannis
(1996), as a weighted sum of contemporaneous and past R&D expenses. Chan et al (2001) show a
positive relationship between the R&D to market value variable and abnormal future stock returns.
Furthermore, they evidence a delayed association of R&D activity and future excess stock returns,
which could be due to a delayed reaction of the stock market or an inadequate adjustment for risk (see
Chambers et al, 2002).
Hall et al (2005) investigate the relationship between knowledge stock and market value in the US
during the period 1963 to 1995. The knowledge stock variable is constructed from R&D expenses,
number of patents and patent citations, capturing the different importance of each patent. They build
on Griliches (1981) to estimate Tobin’s q equations. Their results show that, in addition to patent
counts, patent citations contain important information about stock market value.
Finally, some papers investigated the interaction of firms’ market value and R&D for European
firm-level data. Hall and Oriani (2006) investigate this interaction for German, French and Italian
data. Hall et al (2007) extend the analysis of Hall and Oriani (2006) for 33 European countries. Both
papers find country-dependent results about the stock market valuation of R&D activity.
2.2. Innovation and competition
Technological improvements give innovator companies a competitive advantage. Nevertheless, the non-
rival nature of knowledge may create a business-stealing effect among competitors as the innovator’s
effort decreases the cost of competitor firms’ subsequent innovations. There is a large literature of
economics and strategic management, which differentiates among firms by their R&D and patenting
activity to study the implications of a firm’s research intensity on its competitors’ market value and
innovations.5 The relationship between firms’ stock market value and R&D is investigated by recogniz-
ing that R&D activities are different among companies. Firms strategically decide to be R&D leaders
or followers. Companies that introduce innovative products are R&D leaders, while other firms, who
mimic the products of the innovation leaders, are followers. Results in the existing literature suggest
that R&D leaders have sustained future profitability.
Caves and Porter (1977) introduce a framework that explains intra-industry profit differentials
5 See for example the works of Porter (1979, 1980, 1985).
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based on pre-commitment to specialized resources such as R&D. Gilbert and Newbery (1982) analyze
a model where incremental innovations are awarded to the firm that spends the most on R&D, and
they show that the incumbent firm continues to earn monopoly rents. On the other hand, Reinganum
(1985) shows that incumbent firms have less incentives to invest in innovation: even though incumbents
make more profits in the short-term, entrants are more profitable in the long-term and they overtake
incumbents in the long run.
Jaffe (1986) finds evidence of knowledge spillovers6 by using various indicators of R&D activity. He
evidences that firms whose research is in a sector where there is high research intensity, obtain more
patents per dollar of R&D, higher accounting profits to R&D and higher market value to R&D than
firms in a sector with low R&D intensity.
Caves and Ghemawat (1992) investigate the factors that sustain profit differences across firms within
an industry and find that differentiation-related strategies, which include R&D, are more important
than cost-related strategies. They find that differentiation related strategies are indicative of research
leadership in the product market by introducing new products, services, brands, etc., while cost-related
strategies include higher capacity and cost structure advantages.
Jovanovic and MacDonald (1994) point out that innovation and imitation tend to be substitutes.
Though, the benefits generated by other firms’ R&D efforts depend on the technological differences
among firms and the absorptive capacity of the imitator firm. Naturally, these factors create time lags
in the adoption of technologies.7
Aghion et al (2005) develop a model where competition discourages laggard firms from innovating
but encourages neck-and-neck firms to innovate. Due to the effect of competition on the equilibrium
industry structure, their model generates an inverted-U shaped relationship between innovation and
competition. The paper provides empirical evidence that (1) the average technological distance between
innovation leaders and innovation followers increases with competition, and (2) the inverted-U is steeper
when industries are more neck-and-neck.
Lev et al (2006) use US data over the period 1975 to 2002. They differentiate between R&D leaders
and followers, and compare the stock market valuation of R&D leaders and followers. They show that
R&D leaders earn significant future excess returns, while R&D followers only earn average returns.
6 A spillover of knowledge occurs when a new innovation created by a company is adopted by another firm.
7 Nabseth and Ray (1974), Mansfield et al (1981), Rogers (1983), and Pakes and Schankerman (1984) report that
knowledge spills over gradually, in a dynamic fashion, to other firms.
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Finally, Ciftci et al (2011) find that R&D leaders obtain substantial risk-adjusted returns during
the first four-five future years. However, these excess returns converge to those of R&D followers
afterwards.
3. Data and definitions of innovation leaders and followers
The data applied in this paper have been derived from the general US patent-firm specific data set of
Blazsek and Escribano (2010). In Section 3.1, some details of this general data set are discussed. In
Section 3.2, the construction of the clusters of technologically related firms is summarized. In Section
3.3, the classification of firms to patent innovation leader and follower groups is presented.
3.1. General US patent-firm data set
The general data set includes 4,476 US firms from several manufacturing and services industries of the
US economy for the period 1979 to 2000. These firms published more than 500,000 patents during this
period. Blazsek and Escribano (2010) created a data set for these firms based on the recommendations
of Hall et al (2001).8
The panel data have been collected from several sources. Patent data are obtained from the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and Micro Patents Co. The database includes the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent number, application date, publication date, USPTO
patent number of cited patents, 3-digit US technological class and assignee name (company name if the
patent was assigned to a firm) for each patent. Furthermore, annual stock returns, collected from the
Center for Research on Stock Prices (CRSP), have been downloaded from the Wharton Research Data
Service (WRDS). Additional company specific information have been obtained from the Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) Compustat data files. In particular, the data set includes book value of equity, stock
market value, SIC code and R&D expenditure for all firms. Firm-specific accounting data are corrected
for inflation by using consumer price index data collected from the US Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics. Finally, annual data on the S&P500 stock index return obtained from the Compustat
data files are also included in the panel data set.
8 See the details of the data base procedures and a more detailed description of the general US database in Blazsek
and Escribano (2010).
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3.2. Technological clustering
We use a technology related grouping of all companies of the general US data set. Technology based
grouping of firms is preferred to product-market based (for example SIC based) grouping, as under
a technology based grouping, the flows of knowledge are expected to be more important. Using an
incorrect grouping dilutes the measurement of knowledge spillovers and makes it difficult to identify
competitors’ effects on firm’s innovation activities.
Technological clusters of firms can be formed based on the idea of firms’ technological proximity.
In the past literature, researchers employed different frameworks to capture technological proximity,
which included patent based,9 productivity based10 and alternative measures.11 See the reviews of
Mohnen (1996) and Cincera (2005).
The patent based technological proximity measures may be either technological category based or
patent citations based measures. In the technological category based approach, the number of patents
published by a firm in each technological category is counted, and a vector is formed for each company
over the technological category space. Technological proximity of two firms is computed by evaluating
the distance of their two vectors.12 In the patent citations based framework, the technological proximity
measures capture the overlap in patent citations between firms. These measures ask how many of the
patents that one firm cites are also cited by another firm.13
In this paper, we use a patent technological category based proximity measure to assign firms into
technologically similar groups. Some important questions related to the clustering procedure are:
(1) How to define technological categories? We use 36 technological sub-categories, as suggested
by Hall et al (2001). These authors create 36 two digit technological sub-categories from the
patent technological classification of USPTO, which contains about 400 technological classes.
(2) How to choose the clustering algorithm? We apply Ward’s linkage clustering (Ward, 1963)
9 See Griliches (1979), Scherer (1982), Jaffe (1986, 1988, 1989), Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Stuart and Podolny
(1996), Fagerberg et al (1996), Mowery et al (1996), Breschi et al (1998, 2003), Ahuja (2000), Harhoff (2000), Autant-
Bernard (2001), Fung (2003), Song et al (2003), Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003), Cantner and Meder (2007), Messeni
(2008), Fischer et al (2009) and Lychagin et al (2010).
10 See Kumar and Russell (2002), Frantzen (2004), Aghion et al (2005), Vandenbussche et el. (2006), Griffith et al
(2009) and Islam (2011).
11 See Adams (1990) and Kaiser (2002).
12 See Breschi et al (1998) and Benner and Waldfogel (2008) for reviews. See also the papers of Griliches (1979), Scherer
(1982), Jaffe (1986), Ahuja (2000), Fung (2003) and Song et al (2003).
13 See Stuart and Podolny (1996), Mowery et al (1996) and Fischer et al (2009).
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to perform technological clustering since several papers comparing different clustering techniques,
conclude that Ward’s method tends to identify better clusters than other methods.14
(3) How to measure the distance between two patent count vectors over the space of
technological categories?15 We use the angle distance measure to form technological clusters
of firms due to the fact that the angle measure of proximity is purely directional, therefore, it is
not directly affected by the length of the technological category count vectors.16
(4) How many groups of technologically similar firms to create? We group all firms of the
US data set into 16 clusters.
The technological clustering framework presented creates a technology related grouping of 16 clusters
of the 4,476 US companies of the data set of Blazsek and Escribano (2010). We focus on a specific
cluster of N = 111 companies.
In order to see the product-market industries of the companies of the technological cluster selected,
the SIC and Hall-Mairesse (HM, 1996) based sector classifications of these firms are presented in Tables
1 and 2, respectively. These tables show that the cluster selected mainly includes drugs firms from the
SIC283 sector (Table 1) and the Pharmaceuticals product-market related sector (Table 2). Neverthe-
less, these tables exhibit that the technological cluster includes companies from other product-market
sectors as well. For example, the technological cluster includes firms from the Grain mill products
(SIC2040), Beverages (SIC2080), Paints (SIC2851), Plastics products (SIC3089) and Electromedical &
electrotherapeutic apparatus (SIC3845) industries.
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF TABLE 1, TABLE 2]
Finally, Figure 1 shows the evolution of patent application counts and the estimated total patent
application intensity, over the period 1979 to 2000, for all firms in the technological cluster.17 This
figure shows an exponential growth of patent applications counts over the sample period. The level of
14 See Kuiper and Fisher (1975) and Jain et al (1986).
15 In the past literature, several distance measures have been used in the R&D literature. Three popular measure are:
(1) Euclidean or L2 distance (see Ahuja, 2000; Rosenkopf and Almeida, 2003); (2) angle between two vectors (see Jaffe,
1986, 1989; Autant-Bernard, 2001; Messeni, 2008; Lychagin et al, 2010) and (3) correlation coefficient.
16 “The length of the vector depends on the degree of focus or concentration of the firm’s research interests. (The length
is actually the square root of the Herfindahl index of concentration of the category shares.) Other proximity measures,
notably the Euclidean distance between the vector endpoints, are very sensitive to the length.” (Jaffe, 1986)
17 The patent intensity model applied to estimate total patent application intensity is summarized in Section 4.
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patent applications per year was about 600 patents in 1979, which increased to about 1,300 patents in
2000. Moreover, we observe a local peak of patent counts in 1995 with a level of about 2,000 patents.
This evolution of the number of patents applications is followed remarkably well by our new, flexible
and dynamic Poison-type, count panel data model of patent applications intensity (see Section 4 for
more details on the model specification and estimation).
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 1]
3.3. Definition of the IL and the IFs in the technological cluster
In the R&D literature, alternative definitions of R&D leadership have been proposed. For example,
Lev et al (2006) state: “Firms with R&D intensity measure greater than (lesser than or equal to) that
of the industry are classified as leaders (followers). These authors measure R&D intensity by using
two proxies: the R&D expenditure to sales ratio and the R&D expenditure to market value ratio.”
Furthermore, Chambers et al (2002) and Ciftci et al (2011) use the R&D capital to sales ratio variable
to indicate R&D leadership, where R&D capital is defined as “R&D assets is the asset that would have
been reported if R&D expenditures were capitalized and amortized over five years beginning in the
year after the expenditures were made.”
We define the permanent IL firm based on the absolute temporal dominance observed in the evo-
lution of the knowledge stock built up from the citations weighted annual patent counts, c˜fitnit, over
the period 1979 to 2000. The knowledge stock variable is computed as follows:
∑t
s=0 c˜fisnis(1− δ)t−s,
where nis denotes the number of successful patent applications, c˜fit is the number of citations received
from subsequent patents (forward citations, henceforth) corrected for sample truncation bias by the
fixed effects methodology of Hall et al (2001).18 We employ the c˜fit variable as several previous works
report that the number of forward citations of patents is an appropriate measure of patent quality
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1999; Hall et al, 2001). Finally, a depreciation rate, δ = 15% is used to
account for the decreasing value of past knowledge.19
The firm with the highest knowledge stock in every year during the observation period is called the
permanent IL of the technological cluster. Other firms in the technological cluster are assigned to the
18 See Blazsek and Escribano (2010) for further details.
19 In the R&D literature, several authors use δ = 15%. See for example Hall (1993) and Hall et al (2005).
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permanent IF group.20
Table 3 shows the first 20 of the 111 firms of the technological cluster, ranked according to the
mean knowledge stock over the period 1979 to 2000. The table shows the mean, computed over the
period 1979 to 2000, of the following nine variables: (V1) patent applications count, nit; (V2) forward
citations received count, cfit; (V3) forward citations received count corrected for sample truncation bias
(see Hall et al, 2001), c˜fit; (V4) knowledge stock,
∑t
s=0 c˜fisnis(1− δ)t−s; (V5) log R&D expenses, rit;
(V6) log book value, zit; (V7) log stock market value, mit; (V8) log R&D expenses to log sales, rit/sit;
and (V9) log R&D expenses to log stock market value, rit/mit. In Table 3, firms are ranked according
to the mean knowledge stock (V4). The second column of this table reports the patent innovation
leadership cluster for each company and shows that ‘Merck & Co., Inc.’ (Merck, henceforth) is the
permanent IL of the technological cluster for the first six out of the nine indicators considered in Table
3. The last two indicators, (V8) and (V9), are relative measures of R&D and clearly the rankings based
on those indicators are very different of the rest, (V1) to (V6), and so will be the firm identified as the
IL.
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF TABLE 3]
In order to motivate the choice of Merck as the permanent IL, Table 4 presents the evolution of
the knowledge stock for the firms with the highest mean (V4) over the period 1979 to 2000, with a
clear distance with the second and third firms of the ranking in terms of the stock of knowledge; Eli
Lilly and Abbott Laboratories. Notice also that there was a huge increase in the knowledge stock in
years 1995 to 1997 of these two firms (Figure 1 shows the aggregate effect in terms on the number
of patent applications). Nevertheless, even during those three years, Merck had a stock of knowledge
which is more than double, while during the rest of the years the distance is even larger; from three
to seven times bigger. Table 4 also exhibits that Merck has the highest knowledge stock in every year
among the firms presented, which represent the companies with the highest knowledge stock over the
period 1979 to 2000 in the technological cluster (see Table 3). These results support our conclusion
that Merck, is the permanent IL of the technological cluster. In addition, Figure 2 shows the number
20 Using a different clustering procedure, firms were also classified according to patent innovations intensity to Group
of Leaders (GL) and Group of Followers (GF) clusters. The GL group was formed by the following six companies: Abbott
Laboratories; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co; Eli Lilly and Co; Merck & Co, Inc; Pfizer, Inc; and Warner-Lambert Co. The
econometric PVAR models were also estimated for this classification and the results are qualitatively similar and available
from the authors.
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of patent applications and knowledge stock for the IL (Merck) and the cross-sectional mean knowledge
stock of the IFs during the period 1979 to 2000. This figure also supports the selection of Merck as
the permanent IL since both variables of Merck are above the mean knowledge stock and the mean
number of patent applications of IFs in every year from 1979 until 2000.
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF TABLE 4, FIGURE 2]
The variables (V8) and (V9) are considered in this paper in order to check the robustness of
the patent innovation leadership clustering procedure of our paper with the classification methods of
Chambers et al (2002), Lev et al (2006) and Ciftci et al (2011). These authors employ different R&D
intensity measures like; R&D to sales and R&D to market value ratios to detect R&D leadership. Table
5 summarizes the contemporaneous and dynamic cross-correlation coefficients among these variables.
The results of the rankings obtained for the variables R&D to sales (V8) and R&D to market value
(V9) are not consistent with the clustering method of the present paper, at least, due to the following
three reasons. First, the patent IL, according to variables (V8) and (V9), is different from the IL
determined by the (V4) variable.21 Second, the present work implements a technology based and not a
product-market based industry classification as Chambers et al (2002), Lev et al (2006) and Ciftci et al
(2011). Third, the correlation between market value and (V8)-(V9) are negative (countercyclical), while
the correlation coefficients between market value and (V1)-(V4) are positive (procyclical), motivating
the choice of variable (V4) for the definition of innovation leadership. The cross-correlation coefficients
corresponding to the knowledge stock (V4) are indicated by bold font in Table 5. Furthermore, from the
cross-correlations we conclude that R&D and book value are procyclical but lagging with the knowledge
stock. The number of patent applications and forward citations received are strongly procyclical and
leads the evolution of the stock of knowledge (V4). The two relative measures of R&D intensity, (V8)
and (V9), have a low and countercyclical cross-correlation with the stock of knowledge, and with several
of the other measures of innovation included in Table 5, supporting our view that (V8) and (V9) are
not good indicators to identify ILs.
These facts reflect the intrinsic innovation uncertainty and the uncertainty related to the appropri-
ability of the innovation returns. This uncertainty is reduced once the innovation is patented or the
innovation is kept secret.
21 R&D leadership clustering and correlation results for alternative variables of Chambers et al (2002), Lev et al (2006)
and Ciftcy et al (2008) are available from the authors.
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[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF TABLE 5]
4. PVAR models and empirical results
The PVAR models of this paper include three endogenous variables: stock return, yit, log observ-
able patent intensity, lnλoit and log secret patent intensity, lnλ
∗
it of i = 1, . . . , N technologically
related firms over t = 0, . . . , T periods. We form the following 3 × 1 vector from these variables:
Yit = (Y1it, Y2it, Y3it)′ = (yit, lnλoit, lnλ
∗
it)
′. Moreover, the following deterministic, exogenous and pre-
determined variables are also included in the PVAR model: time trend, t, S&P500 stock index return,
yt, firm size measured by log book value of equity, zit and log R&D expenditure over log market value,
rit−1/mit−1.
The summary of the econometric models and their estimation results is organized as follows. In
Section 4.1, the benchmark innovation and market value Model 1 is presented, which measures the
interaction among a firm’s stock return, observable and latent patent intensity components without
making difference among firms of the panel according to patent innovations leadership. This section
also presents the specification of the dynamic Poisson patent count data model, which separates the
observable and secret components of firms’ patent intensity. In Section 4.2, two extended innovation
and market value models are considered: First, Model 2 measures different effects for the IL and for
IFs but it does not measure directly the inter-firm interaction effects of innovative activity between the
IL and IFs. Second, Model 3 makes difference among firms according to patent innovation leadership
and quantifies the impact of the IL on IFs and the effect of IFs on the IL.
4.1. Benchmark innovation and market value model
Model 1. The first innovation and market value model focuses on the interaction among the firm’s
stock return, observable patent innovations and secret patent innovations. The PVAR model is specified
in two systems of three equations as follows:

yit
lnλoit
lnλ∗it
 =

ωy
ωo
ω∗
+

ρy
ρo
ρ∗
 t+

βy
βo
β∗
 yt+

ψy
ψo
ψ∗
 zit+

φy
φo
φ∗
 rit−1mit−1 +

y˜it
ln λ˜oit
ln λ˜∗it
 (1)
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with 
y˜it
ln λ˜oit
ln λ˜∗it
 =

ayi
aoi
a∗i
+

ζ11 ζ12 ζ13
ζ21 ζ22 ζ23
ζ31 ζ32 ζ33


y˜it−1
ln λ˜oit−1
ln λ˜∗it−1
+

eyit
eoit
e∗it
 , (2)
where the patent intensity, λit is based on observable economic variables (denoted by λoit) and unob-
servable information for the econometrician (denoted by λ∗it). The PVAR model can be reformulated
in a more compact matrix notation as follows:
Yit = γXit + Y˜it = ω + ρt+ βyt + ψzit + φ
rit−1
mit−1
+ Y˜it, (3)
Y˜it = ai + ζY˜it−1 + eit (4)
with eit ∼ N(0,Ωe), Y˜i0 ∼ N(0,Ω0), ai ∼ N(0,Ωa) and cov(Yi0, ai) = Ω0a for i = 1, . . . , N firms that
belong to the certain technologcal cluster, during t = 0, . . . , T years.
The elements of the eit = (eyit, eoit, e∗it, )′ vector of error terms may be contemporaneously cor-
related with each other (through Ωe), but are uncorrelated with their own lagged values and are
uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables of the regression equation. The ai ∼ N(0,Ωa) is
a 3× 1 random vector of firm-specific random effects with covariance matrix Ωa.22 The model controls
for the initial conditions, Y˜i0 ∼ N(0,Ω0) by introducing the Ω0 covariance matrix of Y˜i0 in a short-panel
setup.
In the system of equations (3), ω is a 3 × 1 vector of constant parameters. The ρ, β, ψ and φ are
3×1 parameter vectors, which measure the impact of a linear time trend, t, stock index return, yt, firm
size, zit and lagged R&D expenses to lagged market value, rit−1/mit−1, respectively, on Yit. The first
column of the Xit matrix is a 3× 1 vector of ones (for the constant parameters), while the subsequent
columns include the exogenous explanatory variables.
In the system of equations (4), ζ and Ωe are 3× 3 parameter matrices which capture the dynamic
and contemporaneous interaction, respectively, among the variables of Y˜it = (y˜it, ln λ˜oit, ln λ˜
∗
it)
′. The
ζ11, ζ22, ζ33 elements in the diagonal of ζ capture the first-order autoregressive effects. The six off-
22 An alternative choice for unobservable heterogeneity could be the fixed effects specification discussed in Binder et at
(2005).
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diagonal elements of ζ measure the dynamic impacts of the three endogenous variables. More formally,
ζjk for j, k = 1, 2, 3 captures the partial effect of Y˜kit−1 on Y˜jit, keeping the rest of the variables constant.
Model 1 is covariance stationary when all eigenvalues of ζ are inside the unit circle. The statistical
inference of Model 1 is presented in Appendix 1.
In what follows, the estimation of the observable and latent patent innovation intensities is pre-
sented, which are included in the PVAR Models. An extension of the dynamic patent count data
model of Blazsek and Escribano (2010) is employed to model the patent innovation intensity (λit) of
i = 1, . . . , N firms over t = 0, . . . , T periods. The model includes dynamic latent variables and it can
separate patent intensity to observable (λoit) and secret components (λ
∗
it). These authors show that the
latent variables improve the model specification of previous patent count data models.23
Conditional on the patent application determinants (R&D, etc.), which are “exogenous” follow-
ing the exogeneity testing results of Blazsek and Escribano (2010), we want to analyze the dynamic
interactions of patent application decisions based on observable and unobservable (secret) innovation
determinants at the firm level and their impact on firms’ rates of return. Therefore, this panel data
model is useful to identify important empirical regularities that have not been considered before, and
that are based on important unobserved firm level determinants of innovation like; innovation produc-
tivity, absorptive capacity, managerial ability, etc.; see Arora et al (2008).
Before presenting the patent applications count data model specification, let us introduce some
notation first. In the patent count model applied, the patent applications count, nit is the endogenous
variable. Denote the set of patent counts byNij = {nit : t = 0, . . . , j} with 0 ≤ j ≤ T . Moreover, several
exogenous explanatory variables are also considered: log R&D expenditure, rit, firm size measured by
the log book value, zit, and number of citations made to previous patents of other firms (backward
citations, henceforth) in the same industry, cb1it and in other industries, cb2it.24 Let cbit = (cb1it, cb2it)′
denote a 2× 1 vector capturing backward citations. Moreover, let Qij denote the 4N × j data matrix
23 Blazsek and Escribano (2010) show that the latent variables included in the Poisson model help to solve the potential
endogeneity problem of R&D expenses reported by previous authors. Furthermore, they also show that the conditional
mean function of patent counts is correctly specified in their model with respect to different specification tests.
24 See Fung (2005) about different knowledge pools of firms.
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of exogenous variables:
Qij =

ri0 ri1 · · · rij
zi0 zi1 · · · zij
cbi0 cbi1 · · · cbij
 (5)
with 0 ≤ j ≤ T . Finally, introduce a latent variable denoted by l∗it, which represents the unobservable
determinants of patent applications activity. Denote the set of latent variables by L∗ij = {l∗it : t =
0, . . . , j} with 0 ≤ j ≤ T .
Similarly to Hausman et al (1984), the conditional distribution of patent application counts is
modeled by specifying the conditional hazard function of the point process formed by the patent arrival
times. Define the conditional hazard function at instant τ ≥ 0 (in continuous time) corresponding to
firm i in period t as follows (see Cox and Isham, 1980):
λit(τ) = lim
δ0→0
Pr{nit(τ + δ0)− nit(τ) > 0|Nit−1, L∗it, Qit}
δ0
, (6)
where δ0 > 0 and nit(τ) is the number of patents of the firm i until instant τ in the period t. The
λit(τ) can be interpreted as the instantaneous probability that firm i has a new patent at the point of
time τ in period t given all information available in the beginning of period t. Thus, the conditional
hazard represents the patent application intensity of firm i in period t.25
In this paper, the conditional hazard is assumed to be constant within each period, therefore,
it can be indexed by t as follows: λit = λit(τ). Due to this assumption, the conditional distribu-
tion of patent counts is Poisson distribution with intensity λit. We denote the conditional density of
nit|(Nit−1, L∗it−1, Qit) as follows:
ft(nit|Nit−1, L∗it−1, Qit) =
exp(−λit)λnitit
nit!
. (7)
Furthermore, we specify the log intensity of nit as follows:
lnλit = lnλoit + lnλ
∗
it, (8)
25 Notice that the conditioning set in Equation (6) includes rit, zit, cbit and l
∗
it for period t. Thus, R&D expenses,
patent citations and firm size are exogenous variables in the patent count data model.
16
where lnλoit represents the observable component of patent intensity and lnλ
∗
it denotes the secret
component of patent intensity. These two components of patent application intensity are formulated
as follows. First, the firm-level patent fundamentals observed for the econometrician are given by
lnλoit = κ0ini1 + κ1i lnλ
o
it−1 + κ2irit + κ3ir
2
it + κ4icb1itrit + κ5icb2itrit + κ6izit, (9)
where κ0i controls for initial conditions of firm i and |κ1i| < 1 measures the AR(1) impact of the
observable component of firm i.26 The κ2i and κ3i parameters capture the linear and quadratic impacts
of R&D expenses, respectively. κ4i and κ5i control for the interaction of R&D expenses with intra-
industry and inter-industry backward citations, respectively. Finally, κ6i measures the impact of firm
size. Second, the patent intensity related to information that is only available for the firm but not
observed for the econometrician (secret) is specified as follows:
lnλ∗it = µ0i + σil
∗
it, (10)
where µ0i is a parameter capturing the unobserved firm specific fixed effects like managerial ability, etc.,
σi is a real parameter that measures part of the firm’s unobserved absorptive capacity by capturing
the impact of l∗it on patent intensity, i.e. firm level component of innovation productivity,
l∗it = µ
∗
i l
∗
it−1 + uit (11)
with uit ∼ N(0, 1) i.i.d., where |µ∗i | < 1 captures the dynamics of unobserved firm level innovation
productivity which follows an AR(1) process with positive coefficient indicating the usual persistent
behavior of productivity shocks.27
In this paper, a univariate count data model is estimated for each firm separately. The statistical
inference of the Poisson model is presented in Appendix 2. After the estimation of the count data
model’s parameters, the filtered estimates of λ∗it are computed in order to be included in the PVAR
models; see Appendix 3.
26 This specification is different from Wooldridge (2005), where the nit−1 dynamic term is considered in lnλit. In the
present work, nit includes both the observable and latent patent intensity. Therefore, ln λ
o
it−1 is included in lnλ
o
it, instead
of nit−1, to separate the observable and latent components of patent intensity.
27 Notice that in the AR(1) specification of Equation (11), the constant is restricted to zero value due to parameter
identification reasons.
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Empirical results for the patent count data model. The number of parameters estimated in the
univariate dynamic Poisson models is high, therefore, they are not fully reported in this paper.
In order to give a general overview of the patent intensity model estimation results, the mean
patent innovations intensity estimates and patent counts, over the period 1979 to 2000, are presented
in Figure 1. Our patent intensity model is able to track very well the positive trend as well as the
behavior through the business cycle, of the number of patent applications per year. Moreover, the
evolution of the mean observable and the mean latent patent intensity components, over the same
period, is presented on Figure 3. This figure shows that the level of observable and secret patent
innovations activity has been similar and approximately constant from 1979 until 1987. However, the
observable component of patent intensity increased after 1987. Until 1992, the latent patent innovations
intensity component stayed constant but afterwards it also increased. As the overall increase in the
level of the observable component was more significant than that of the secret component, the level
of the observable component was more than twice as high as that of the latent component in the
mid-90’s. Nevertheless, in the last years of our sample, a decreasing tendency of both components of
patent application intensity can be observed. The observable component decreased after 1997, while the
secret component fall after 1996. As a consequence, the level of observable patent innovation intensity
is about three times higher than the level of secret patent innovation intensity in 2000.
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 3]
The main advantage of the patent count data model of this paper is that it includes a set of
latent variables, l∗it. In the remaining part of this subsection, the estimation results of the µ
∗
i and σi
parameters are summarized.
The firm-specific impact of l∗it is measured by the σi parameter, interpreted as the unpredicted
absorptive capacity of the firm due to secret innovations, see Escribano et al (2009) for an alternative
approach. Furthermore, the long-run impact of a unit shock in uit on σil∗it can be expressed as follows.
First, consider the infinite moving average representation of l∗it:
l∗it =
(
1
1− µ∗iL
)
uit =
[
1 + µ∗iL+ (µ
∗
i )
2L2 + . . .
]
uit = µ∗i (L)uit. (12)
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Substituting this representation of l∗it into Equation (10) we obtain
lnλ∗it = µ0i + σiµ
∗
i (L)uit. (13)
In the long run (L = 1), this equation becomes
lnλ∗it = µ0i + σiµ
∗
i (1)uit. (14)
Therefore, the long run impact of secret innovations (uit) on unobserved patent intensity is given by
∂ lnλ∗it
∂uit
∣∣∣∣
L=1
= σiµ∗i (1) =
σi
1− µ∗i
, (15)
which depends on two factors: the unpredicted absorptive capacity due to unobserved innovation factors
(σi) and the unobserved degree of persistence of the secret innovation process (µ∗i ). The interpretation
of 1/σi is derived as follows. First, rewrite Equation (10) as:
l∗it =
1
σi
(lnλ∗it − µi). (16)
Then, we can express 1/σi by taking the following derivative of l∗it:
∂l∗it
∂(lnλ∗it − µi)
=
1
σi
(17)
and it measures the marginal effects of secret patent intensity (lnλ∗it) on unobserved innovation produc-
tivity (l∗it). Table 6 shows 30 firms from the technological cluster, ranked according to two indicators:
(1) their predictive absorptive capacity generated from the innovations kept secret by the i-th firm, 1/σi
and (2) their mean log market value, (1/T )
∑T
t=1mit. One important conclusion comes out of Table
6; Merck is not only the IL firm but it is also the firm with the highest predictive absorptive capacity
and with the highest transform rate of secret patent intensity into unobserved innovation productivity,
see Equation (18).
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF TABLE 6]
Figure 4 presents the estimates of 1/σi for the 60 firms, as a function of the means of the variables
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(V1)-(V7) and mean annual stock return, computed over the period 1979 to 2000. The figure exhibits
the estimates of the linear regression line fitted to 1/σi and the corresponding R-squared values to
inform about the explanatory power of each variable. The first four panels in Figure 4 show that
firms with high patent applications count (V1), high patent citations received count (V2, V3) and high
patent citations weighted patent applications count (V4) tend to have higher 1/σi. Panel five presents
that firms with high R&D expenses (V5) have high predictive absorptive capacity. Panel six exhibits
that large firms (high book value, V6) have higher predictive absorptive capacity. Finally, the last two
panels evidence that firms with high log market value (V7) and high annual stock return also tend to
have higher predictive absorptive capacity. In summary, Figure 4 shows that those firms with a high
predictive unobserved absorptive capacity, are those that invest more in R&D, receive more forward
citations, apply for more patents and have higher stock returns and stock market values. Between 30%
to 51% of the variability (R-squared) of the predictive absorptive capacity due to secret innovation is
explained by individual firm level performance measures.
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 4]
Empirical results for Model 1. Table 7 presents the parameter estimates of Model 1. First, in
the system of equations (1), significant positive trends are estimated for stock return (δˆy = 0.02),
observable patent intensity (δˆo = 0.46) and secret patent intensity (δˆ∗ = 0.18). Significant and positive
β coefficients are measured for the impact of the S&P500 stock index return. The highest βˆy = 0.72
coefficient is observed for the stock return and positive βˆo = 0.09 and βˆ∗ = 0.05 and significant
parameters are found for the impact of the S&P500 return on observable patent innovations and secret
patent innovations, respectively. The influence of firm size is different for each endogenous variable:
(1) smaller companies tend to have higher stock returns than large ones, i.e. ψˆy = −0.15; (2) large
firms have a positive impact on observable patent intensity, i.e. ψˆo = 0.02; and (3) smaller firms
produce more secret innovations than large companies, i.e. ψˆ∗ = −0.06. Finally, lagged R&D intensity
measured by R&D to market value has a significant positive effect on firms’ stock market valuation
(φˆy = 3.15) and on observable patent activity (φˆo = 0.05), while it has a significant negative effect on
latent patent innovation intensity (φˆ∗ = −0.15), which is consistent with the negative cross-correlations
between (V9) and the stock of knowledge shown in Table 5.
Second, in the system of market adjusted equations (2), the ζ matrix shows significant and positive
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PVAR(1) dynamics of both observable and secret patent intensity components with higher persistence
in the latent component. There is a significant positive dynamic impact of observable patent intensity
(ζˆ12 = 0.19) and a significant positive dynamic impact of secret patent activity (ζˆ13 = 0.70) on stock
return. Therefore, the results suggest that the dynamic impact of the latent patent intensity component
on stock return is much higher than that of the observable component. Furthermore, a positive dynamic
interaction is found between the observable and latent intensity components: ζˆ23 = 0.70 and ζˆ32 = 0.21.
The estimates show that the impact of the secret component on the observable component is higher than
the opposite effect: (ζˆ23 = 0.70) > (ζˆ32 = 0.21). We find that the PVAR process is covariance stationary
(see the maximum modulus of the eigenvalues of ζˆ in Table 7). Finally, the estimates presented in
the Ωe matrix measure the contemporaneous interaction among the three endogenous variables. The
parameter values show a significant positive contemporaneous interaction between shocks in the stock
return and shocks in the secret patent intensity (Ωˆe13 = 0.36), and between shocks in observable and
latent patent innovations activity (Ωˆe23 = 0.37). However, a negative contemporaneous covariance is
found between shocks in the stock return and observable patent activity (Ωˆe12 = −0.20).
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF TABLE 7]
IRF of Model 1. In order to interpret the dynamic effects of the parameter estimates of the PVAR
model over several lags, the IRFs are also estimated. These represent the impact of a current unit
shock in the orthogonal (structural) error terms, ²it = (²yit, ²oit, ²∗it)′ = (
√
Ωe)−1eit, on future values
of Y˜it. We use the methodology of Cao and Sun (2011), who establish the asymptotic distributions
of the IRFs in short PVARs. They derive the estimate of the IRF and show how the corresponding
confidence bands can be estimated. Cao and Sun (2011) prove the asymptotic validity of a bootstrap
approximation of confidence bands.
The orthogonalized IRF of Model 1 is derived in Appendix 4, where we obtain that
Y˜it =
∞∑
j=0
ζjai +
∞∑
j=0
ζj
√
Ωe²it−j . (18)
Therefore, the IRF is given by the following infinite sequence of the matrices of standardized dynamic
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multipliers, Θj :
Θj = (ζ)j
√
Ωe for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞, (19)
where
√
Ωe, the lower triangular Cholesky matrix of Ωe, is used to orthogonalize the IRF. The 95%
confidence bands around the estimate of Θj are obtained by the simulation based method suggested
by Cao and Sun (2011). The 97.5% and 2.5% quantiles of Θj are estimated by 10,000 Monte Carlo
replications of Θj .
In the VAR literature, there are different choices for the matrix used to orthogonalize the IRF.
The different matrices are determined by the different orders of equations in the system. We have
three endogenous variables in the PVAR model, i.e. there are six possible orders of the equations.
The Cholesky matrix,
√
Ωe and the standardized dynamic multiplier, Θj is different for each order.
Nevertheless, the estimation procedure of Model 1, presented in Appendix 1, assumes that the diagonal
of
√
Ωe is normalized to ones for parameter identification reasons. This assumption implies a certain
order for the equations as only for the order (yit, lnλoit, lnλ
∗
it) it is obtained that the diagonal of
√
Ωe
contains ones. For different orders of equations, the diagonal of the Cholesky matrix does not equal
to ones, therefore, it is not compatible with the normalization assumption of Appendix 1. As a
consequence, we apply the order (yit, lnλoit, lnλ
∗
it) to orthogonalize the IRF. The economic intuition
behind these a priori identification restrictions is given below, after Equation (20).
The following restrictions are imposed on the contemporaneous relations (see Appendix 1):
Θ0²it = (ζ)0
√
Ωe²it =

1 0 0
Ωe21 1 0
Ωe31 Ωe32 1


²yit
²oit
²∗it
 =

²yit
Ωe21²yit + ²oit
Ωe31²yit +Ωe32²oit + ²∗it
 . (20)
The intuitive justification of these restrictions is the following: It is clear that the firm’s innovation
decisions are affected by more than one type of shock. Therefore, for identification reasons, we need
to impose certain a priori restrictions. The restrictions we are imposing are based on the presumption
“innovations and patent intensity news affect stock returns with a lag, while any variation in stock
returns is rapidly affecting innovation decisions”. News on observable patent intensity, affect contem-
poraneously patent intensity decisions based on secret innovations, but not the other way around.
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That is, all the contemporaneous relations among the three variables, are associated either to financial
information (stock returns) or to observable patent intensity decisions. Secret innovations require more
time to be spread within the firm given to warranty the information is confidential. However, when
these secret innovations are transmitted internally or spillover other firms, they are expected to have
higher and more persistent impacts than observable innovations.
The contemporaneous relationships among the endogenous variables, Y˜it are calculated as follows.
We orthogonalize Equation (4) multiplying each term by (
√
Ωe)−1:
(
√
Ωe)−1Y˜it = (
√
Ωe)−1ai + (
√
Ωe)−1ζY˜it−1 + ²it. (21)
According to the estimates of (
√
Ωe)−1, reported in Table 7, the left hand side of Equation (21) is

1.00 0.00 0.00
0.20 1.00 0.00
−0.45 −0.44 1.00


y˜it
ln λ˜oit
ln λ˜∗it
 =

y˜it
0.20y˜it + ln λ˜oit
−0.45y˜it − 0.44 ln λ˜oit + ln λ˜∗it
 (22)
Combining Equations (21) and (22), we obtain that the contemporaneous relationships are indicated
by the first term of the right hand side of the following equation:

y˜it
ln λ˜oit
ln λ˜∗it
 =

0.00
−0.20y˜it
0.45y˜it + 0.44 ln λ˜oit
+

ayi
0.20ayi + aoi
−0.45ayi − 0.44aoi + a∗i
+
+

0.04y˜it−1 + 0.19 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.7 ln λ˜
∗
it−1
0.02y˜it−1 + 0.26 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.84 ln λ˜
∗
it−1
0.01y˜it−1 + 0.03 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.08 ln λ˜
∗
it−1
+

²yit
²oit
²∗it
 . (23)
The infinite Vector Moving Average (VMA) representation of Y˜it helps to interpret the matrix of
standardized dynamic multipliers, Θj presented on Figure 5:
Y˜it = (I3 − ζL)−1ai +
∞∑
j=0
Θj²it−j . (24)
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In the previous formula, Θj = ∂Y˜it/∂²it−j measures how unit impulses of standardized shocks at time
t− j impact Y˜it. More precisely, each element of Θj can be expressed as follows:
Θj =

Θj11 Θj12 Θj13
Θj21 Θj22 Θj23
Θj31 Θj32 Θj33
 =

∂y˜it+j
∂²yit
∂y˜it+j
∂²oit
∂y˜it+j
∂²∗it
∂ ln λ˜oit+j
∂²yit
∂ ln λ˜oit+j
∂²oit
∂ ln λ˜oit+j
∂²∗it
∂ ln λ˜∗it+j
∂²yit
∂ ln λ˜∗it+j
∂²oit
∂ ln λ˜∗it+j
∂²∗it
 . (25)
A general element, Θjkl is interpreted as the impact of one unit standardized shock, ²lit on the variable
Ykit+j .
Figure 5 exhibits for Model 1 the evolution of six components of Θj and the corresponding confidence
bands for j = 1, . . . , 15 future periods to report decreasing dynamic effects of the orthogonalized error
terms on future stock returns, observable patent intensities and secret patent intensities. Figure 5
shows: a) The impacts of secret innovation shocks are the largest. The dynamic effects on stock
returns, on observable and on secret patent intensities are of similar positive magnitude with a similar
slow path of decline, reaching zero only after 12 years. b) Observable innovation shocks have impacts
of lower positive magnitude on stock returns, observable and secret sources of patent intensity and
share common high speed of decline, reaching zero only after two or three years.
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 5]
Our PVAR models are covariance stationary, therefore, limj→∞Θjkl = 0 for k, l = 1, 2, 3 and no
standard shock, ²it−j has long-run impact on Y˜it. However, it is interesting to evaluate the long-run
cumulative impact of standardized shocks by considering the following long-run impact matrix:
Θj(1) =

Θ11(1) Θ12(1) Θ13(1)
Θ21(1) Θ22(1) Θ23(1)
Θ31(1) Θ32(1) Θ33(1)
 =

∑∞
j=0Θj11
∑∞
j=0Θj12
∑∞
j=0Θj13∑∞
j=0Θj21
∑∞
j=0Θj22
∑∞
j=0Θj23∑∞
j=0Θj31
∑∞
j=0Θj32
∑∞
j=0Θj33
 . (26)
In this paper, Θj = (ζ)j
√
Ωe, therefore, the long-run impact matrix of Model 1 can be computed as
follows:
Θj(1) =
∞∑
j=0
Θj =
∞∑
j=0
(ζ)j
√
Ωe = (I3 − ζ)−1
√
Ωe. (27)
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The long-run impact matrix, Θj(1), estimated for Model 1 is presented in Table 7. The results show
that the structural latent innovation shocks has the highest long-term impact on all variables, followed
by, the long-term impact of the structural observable innovation shocks and stock return error terms.
In summary, among the innovation factors affecting the firms, the secret innovation kept by the firms
is the one affecting more, and positively, the returns of the firms. This important empirical finding
is consistent with the results obtained by Pakes (1985), in a different context, where unpredictable
increases in patents increases the market value of firms.
4.2. Extended innovation and market value models
In this section, two extensions of the benchmark PVAR model are proposed (Models 2 and 3) and the
corresponding estimation results are summarized. Model 2 measures different effects for the IL and for
IFs. Nevertheless, it does not measure directly the inter-firm interaction effects of innovative activity
between the IL and IFs. Model 3 parameterizes the impact of the IL on IFs and the effect of IFs on
the IL.
Model 2. Differential effects of the single IL in innovation. Model 2 considers IL and IF
companies of the technological cluster. The model is specified as follows:
Yit = γXit + γILXitD(i = IL) + Y˜it, (28)
=
(
ω + δt+ βyt + ψzit + φ
rit−1
mit−1
)
+
+
(
ωIL + δILt+ βILyt + ψILzit + φIL
rit−1
mit−1
)
D(i = IL) + Y˜it
Y˜it = ai + ζY˜it−1 + ζILY˜it−1D(i = IL) + eit (29)
with eit ∼ N(0,Ωe), Y˜i0 ∼ N(0,Ω0), ai ∼ N(0,Ωa) and cov(Yi0, ai) = Ω0a. The dummy variable
D(i = IL) = 1 if i = IL and zero otherwise. In systems of equations (28) and (29), the γIL and
ζIL matrices measure the additional impacts of the IL firm not captured by the γ and ζ parameter
matrices, respectively. Thus, the IF effects are captured by the estimates of γ and ζ, while the IL
effects are measured by the (γ + γIL) and (ζ + ζIL) matrices. The interpretation of the components of
the (γ+γIL) and (ζ+ ζIL) matrices coincide with those of the γ and ζ matrices, respectively, for Model
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1. Model 2 is covariance stationary when all eigenvalues of both ζ and (ζ + ζIL) are inside the unit
circle. Interpretation of the parameters also included in Model 1 is the same as before. The estimation
of Model 2 is summarized in Appendix 1.
Empirical results for Model 2. The parameter estimates of Model 2 are presented in Table 8.
First, in the system of equations (28), the γ parameter matrix indicates the parameters of the firms
that are IFs and similar estimation results are obtained as in Model 1. Therefore, the results reported
for Model 1 for the γ parameter are valid for the IFs in Model 2. For the IL firm, the estimates of
(γ + γIL) for Model 2 indicates the behavior of the leader. Most parameters of the (γˆ + γˆIL) matrix
are similar to γˆ. Nevertheless, the impact of firm size on stock returns of the IL is not significant
(ψˆy + ψˆILy = −0.12 + 0.12 = 0.00), and firm size has a positive effect on the secret patent innovations
intensity of the IL (ψˆ∗ + ψˆIL∗ = −0.02 + 0.05 = 0.03).
Second, in the system of equations (29), similar estimation results are also obtained for the ζ and
Ωe parameter matrices as in Model 1. Therefore, the results for the ζ parameters reported for Model 1
are valid for IF companies in Model 2, and the results reported for Model 1 for the Ωe parameters are
valid for all companies in the sample. The estimates of (ζ + ζIL) can be interpreted for the IL firm in
Model 2. Most but some key parameters of the (ζˆ + ζˆIL) matrix are similar to ζˆ. In particular, lagged
stock return has a positive effect on current secret patent innovations intensity (ζˆ31+ ζˆ31IL = 0.10) and
on current returns (ζˆ11 + ζˆ11IL = 0.23) for the IL. Finally, the AR process is found to be stationary for
Model 2 since all eigenvalues of ζˆ and (ζˆ + ζˆIL) are inside the unit circle (see Table 8). However, the
persistence on the stock returns of the IL is much higher (ζˆ11 + ζˆ11IL = 0.23, AR(1) coefficient) than
that of the IFs (ζˆ11 = 0.04). The opposite result is obtained for the two (observed and unobserved)
patent intensity components. Therefore, the marked adjusted patent intensities of the innovation leader
is less predictable than the followers.
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF TABLE 8]
IRF of Model 2. We apply the methodology of Cao and Sun (2011) to derive the estimates of the
orthogonalized IRFs and the corresponding 95% confidence bands of Model 2. The IRFs are derived
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in Appendix 4, where we obtain that
Y˜it =
∞∑
j=0
[ζ + ζILD(i = IL)]jai +
∞∑
j=0
[ζ + ζILD(i = IL)]j(
√
Ωe)²it−j . (30)
Therefore, the IRFs are given by
Θij(IL) = (ζ + ζIL)j
√
Ωe for i = IL and j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞, (31)
Θij(IF) = ζj
√
Ωe for i ∈ IF and j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (32)
Figure 5 exhibits for Model 2 the evolution of six components of Θij for i = IL, denoted by Θij(IL) for
j = 1, . . . , 15 future periods, to exhibit decreasing dynamic effects of the orthogonalized error terms on
future stock returns, observable patent intensities and secret patent intensities. The IRFs corresponding
to the IF company are not reported since they are similar to the IRF presented for Model 1 of Figure
5. The IRF of the IL are only similar to the IRF of the IFs for the shocks an returns. The positive
reactions to shocks on innovation intensity components are of much lower magnitude than those of IFs
and their speed of decline is much faster for the IL than for the rest.
The long-run impact matrix of Model 2 for IL and IF firms can be computed as follows:
Θij(1) = (I3 − ζ − ζIL)−1
√
Ωe for i = IL and j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞ (33)
and
Θij(1) = (I3 − ζ)−1
√
Ωe for i ∈ IF and j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (34)
The estimates of the long-run impact matrices are presented in Table 8. For the IF firms, the results
show that the structural impulse of the latent innovation error term is the largest in terms of the
quantitative impact but is the most persistent shock, followed by, the observable patent intensity and
stock return shocks for all variables. For the IL company, all long run impacts are also positive but
of a much lower magnitude than for the rest of the firms (IFs). The long-run impact of stock return
impulses is the highest for y˜it, the impact of observable innovation impulses is the highest for ln λ˜oit
and the impact of secret innovation impulses is the highest for ln λ˜∗it. The main conclusion we extract
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from this analysis is that the long run impacts of any of shocks are much larger for innovation follower
firms than for the leader.
Model 3. Interactions between the patent innovations of IL and IFs. This specification
measures the impact of the IL company on IFs and IFs on the IL firm. The model is formulated as
follows:
Yit = γXit + Y˜it = ω + δt+ βyit + ψzit + φ
rit−1
mit−1
+ Y˜it, (35)
Y˜it = ai + ζY˜it−1 +D(i ∈ IF)ζILY˜ILt−1 +D(i = IL)
(∑
k∈IF
ζIFY˜kt−1
)
+ eit (36)
with eit ∼ N(0,Ωe), Y˜i0 ∼ N(0,Ω0), ai ∼ N(0,Ωa) and cov(Yi0, ai) = Ω0a. The parameters with
subindex IL measure the impact of the IL firm on IF companies, while the parameters with subindex
IF capture the effects of IF firms on the IL. The interpretation of the parameters also included in Model
1 is the same as before. Model 3 is covariance stationary when all eigenvalues of ζ are inside the unit
circle.
Empirical results for Model 3. The parameter estimates of Model 3 are presented in Table 9. First,
in the system of equations (35), for the γ parameters similar values are estimated as in the previous
PVAR models. Second, in the systems of equations (36), for the ζ and Ωe parameter matrices similar
results are obtained as in Models 1 and 2. The AR process is covariance stationary for Model 3 (see
Table 9). Finally, several parameters of the ζIL, ζIF matrices, which account for the interaction effects
of the IL and IFs, are found to be significantly different from zero. More details about the multiperiod
dynamic results of inter-firm interaction are provided in the following subsection.
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF TABLE 9]
IRF and dynamic multipliers of Model 3. We employ the methodology of Cao and Sun (2011)
to compute the orthogonalized IRFs and their 95% confidence bands of Model 3. In addition, the
so-called dynamic multipliers are also computed for Model 3, which account for the dynamic inter-firm
effects between the patent IL and IFs. The IRFs and the dynamic multipliers are derived in Appendix
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4, where we obtain that
Y˜it =
∞∑
j=0
ζjai +
∞∑
j=0
ζjζILY˜ILt−1−jD(i ∈ IF)+ (37)
+
∞∑
j=0
∑
k∈IF
ζjζIFY˜kt−1−jD(i = IL) +
∞∑
j=0
ζj(
√
Ωe)²it−j .
Therefore, the IRFs of Model 3 are given by:
Θj = (ζ)j
√
Ωe for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (38)
Moreover, the dynamic multipliers or interaction effects between leaders and followers are given by:
Γj(IL→ IF) = (Effects of Y˜ILt−j on Y˜it for i ∈ IF) = ζjζIL for j = 1, 2, . . . ,∞, (39)
Γj(IF→ IL) = (Effects of Y˜kt−j for k ∈ IF on Y˜ILt) = ζjζIF for j = 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (40)
Figure 6 exhibits the evolution of twelve components of Γj(IL→ IF) and Γj(IF→ IL) for j = 1, . . . , 15
future periods to report decreasing dynamic effects of other companies on the firm’s future stock returns,
observable patent intensities and secret patent intensities. Figure 6 shows the next results for different
components of Γ.
The interactions from the IL to the IFs are the following: a) Shocks on observable patent intensities
of the IL have low positive impacts on stock returns and patent intensities of IFs that vanish after two
years. The effects on secret patent intensities of the IFs are negative but also last only two years. b)
Shocks on secret patent intensities of the IL have much larger effects on the IFs and the spillovers last
more than 10 years before disappearing. Those innovations that spillover from IL to IFs are positive
for stock returns and observables patent intensities (complements) and are negative for secret patent
intensities (substitutes). Interactions from the IFs to the IL are of much lower magnitude: a) The
impact of observable patent intensities of the IFs on the IL are small and last only one year. Those
spillover effects are negative for stock returns and secret patent intensities and positive for observable
patent intensity (complements). b) The spillovers from secret patent intensities of the IFs on the IL
are more important and last longer (10 years). The signs are the same as the spillovers from IFs to IL
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on observable patent intensities. Therefore, the dominant spillovers goes from the IL to the IFs and
are specially important if they are based on secret patent information decisions of the firm.
The long-run impact matrix of Model 3 can be computed by Θj(1) = (I3− ζ)−1
√
Ωe. The estimate
of this matrix is presented in Table 9. The results show that the structural latent error term has the
highest long-term impact on all variables, followed by the structural observable and stock return error
terms.
[APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF FIGURE 6]
5. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we use dynamic panel data models to identify the interaction among stock return,
observable and secret patent application activity for a cluster of technologically related US firms for
the 22-year time period of 1979 to 2000. We create the technological cluster by Ward’s (1963) method
by using firm-level data on patent counts over the technological category space. The technological
cluster analyzed includes 111 firms. Most of these firms are from the pharmaceutical product-market
sector (SIC283). However, some firms of the cluster operate in different product-market industries, like
computers, chemicals or food sectors.
We classify the firms of the technological cluster according to their patent stock of knowledge into
patent innovation leader and followers groups. In particular, we identify a single Innovation Leader
(IL) firm over the period 1979 to 2000: Merck & Co. As this company preserves its leadership during
the whole period, we say that Merck is the permanent IL of the technological cluster. We assign other
technologically related firms to the Innovation Follower (IF) cluster.
We estimate several dynamic PVAR market value models by the Quasi Maximum Likelihood (QML)
method of Binder et al (2005). In these models, a secret patent application intensity component is
included. We model this latent patent intensity component according to the Poisson-type count data
framework of Blazsek and Escribano (2010). This patent count data model is estimated by the MSL
method, applying the Efficient Importance Sampling (EIS) variance reduction technique of Richard
and Zhang (2007).
The parameter estimates, the IRFs and the dynamic multipliers of the PVAR market value models
have suggested significant contemporaneous and dynamic intra-firm and inter-firm (spillover) effects
30
among stock returns, observable patent intensity and secret patent intensity in the technological cluster
analyzed. The main conclusions are the following:
a) Empirical results considering all firms (Model 1): Innovation shocks based on observables have a
small and short (only two years) positive impact on stock returns and on observable and unobservable
patent intensities. However, innovations shocks based on secret information have large and long (more
than 10 years) positive effects on stock returns and on observable and unobservable patent intensities.
b) Results considering separately IL and IFs (Model 2): The results for IFs are similar to those
mentioned before for all firms. However, the behavior of the IL is different. The innovation shocks
based on observables are also short (2 years) but smaller than the rest of the firms. This is also valid
for the innovation shocks based on secret patent intensities of the IL but it is not true for the stock
returns of the IL; the reaction of the stock returns of the IL is similar to the rest of the firms (IFs). In
summary, the stock returns reaction of the IL is similar to the IFs but the innovations reactions of the
IL are smaller and have shorter memory.
c) Innovation spillovers among innovation leaders and followers (Model 3): The flow of innovation
spillovers is larger from the IL to the IFs, than the other way around. The interaction effects of inno-
vation shocks are large if they flow from IL to IFs, specially if the source of innovation is secret. These
spillovers are positive between observable patent intensities (innovation complements) and negative
between secret patent intensities (innovation substitutes). In both cases, the spillovers last more than
10 years from IL to IFs and around 5 years if the flow goes from IFs to IL. The reaction on stock
returns of the IL and the IFs differ in magnitude and sign; the main spillovers again come from the
secret innovation component (last 10 years) and are positive going from IL to IFs and are negative,
but of similar magnitude, going form IFs to the IL. In summary, the innovation spillovers benefit more
IFs than the IL.
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Appendix 1: Estimation of PVAR models by QML
This appendix presents the statistical inference applied for the PVAR Models 1, 2 and 3. These models
are estimated by the QML method proposed by Binder et al (2005).28 Definitions of parameters in
these equations are presented in Section 4. In order to simplify the notation, let N refer to the sample
size of all models in this appendix.
The covariance matrices Ωe, Ω0 and Ωa are parameterized as follows. In order to identify the
parameters in these matrices, the diagonals of the
√
Ωe,
√
Ω0 and
√
Ωa matrices are restricted to ones:
√
Ωe =

1 0 0
Ωe21 1 0
Ωe31 Ωe32 1
 , √Ω0 =

1 0 0
Ω021 1 0
Ω031 Ω032 1
 , √Ωa =

1 0 0
Ωa21 1 0
Ωa31 Ωa32 1
 . (A1.1)
These Cholesky matrices imply the following parameterization of Ωe, Ω0 and Ωa:
Ωe =

1 Ωe21 Ωe31
Ωe21 Ω
2
e21 + 1 Ωe21Ωe31 +Ωe32
Ωe31 Ωe21Ωe31 +Ωe32 Ω
2
e31 +Ω
2
e32 + 1
 , (A1.2)
Ω0 =

1 Ω021 Ω031
Ω021 Ω
2
021
+ 1 Ω021Ω031 +Ω032
Ω031 Ω021Ω031 +Ω032 Ω
2
031
+Ω2032 + 1
 ,
Ωa =

1 Ωa21 Ωa31
Ωa21 Ω
2
a21 + 1 Ωa21Ωa31 +Ωa32
Ωa31 Ωa21Ωa31 +Ωa32 Ω
2
a31 +Ω
2
a32 + 1
 .
This specification yields symmetric and positive semidefinite covariance matrices.29 Furthermore, the
elements of the Ω0a 3 × 3 matrix capturing the covariance between ai and Yi0, are restricted to zeros
due to parameter identification reasons.
28 In the literature, several papers have analyzed likelihood based estimation of dynamic panel data models. See
Balestra and Nerlove (1966), Nerlove (1971), Bhargava and Sargan (1983), and Nerlove and Balestra (1996) for dynamic
panel data models with random effects. See Lancaster (2002), Hsiao et al (2002), Groen and Kleibergen (2003), Bun and
Carree (2005), Kruiniger (2008), and Dhaene and Jochmans (2010) for dynamic panel data models with fixed effects.
29 Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Gil-Alana and Moreno (2009) impose similar restrictions.
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Let θ denote the vector of the model’s parameters. Let Y˜ = (Y˜1, . . . , Y˜N |Xi0, . . . , XiT ) and let
Y˜i = (Y˜i0, . . . , Y˜iT ). The random effects QML estimator of the vector of parameters θ is obtained by
maximizing the following log-likelihood function:
lnL(Y˜; θ) =
N∑
i=1
ln f(Y˜i|Xi0, . . . , XiT ) =
N∑
i=1
−3(T + 1)
2
ln(2pi)− 1
2
ln |Ση| − 12ω
′
iΣ
−1
η ωi, (A1.3)
where Ση is a 3(T + 1)× 3(T + 1) matrix defined as:
Ση =
 Ω0 ι′T ⊗ Ω′0a
ιT ⊗ Ω0a IT ⊗ Ωe + ιT ι′T ⊗ Ωa
 (A1.4)
with ιT being a T × 1 vector of ones, IT being a T × T identity matrix. Furthermore, each element of
ωi = (ωi0, . . . , ωiT ) = [(ai + ei0), . . . , (ai + eiT )] is computed as follows:
Model 1 : ωit = Y˜it − ζY˜it−1
Model 2 : ωit = Y˜it − ζY˜it−1 − ζILY˜it−1D(i = IL)
Model 3 : ωit = Y˜it − ζY˜it−1 −D(i ∈ IF)ζILY˜ILt−1 −D(i = IL)
(∑
k∈IF ζIFY˜kt−1
)
.
(A1.5)
Appendix 2: Estimation of the patent count data model by EIS
The inference procedure of Blazsek and Escribano (2010) is applied for the Poisson model with latent
variables. The model is estimated by the MSL method (Gourie´roux and Monfort, 1991), using the EIS
technique of Richard and Zhang (2007). The EIS method has been applied for the precise evaluation
of likelihood functions involving high-dimensional integrals for example in stochastic volatility models
(Liesenfeld and Richard, 2003) and stochastic conditional intensity models (Bauwens and Hautsch,
2006). Recall from Equation (7) that the conditional density of nit|(Nit−1, L∗it−1, Qit) is given by:
ft(nit|Nit−1, L∗it−1, Qit) =
exp(−λit)λnitit
nit!
. (A2.1)
Furthermore, the density of the dynamic latent variable l∗it conditional on l
∗
it−1 is given by:
f∗t (l
∗
it|l∗it−1) =
1√
2pi
exp
[
−(l
∗
it − µ∗i l∗it−1)2
2
]
. (A2.2)
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If all latent variables (l∗it : t = 0, . . . , T ) were observable then the joint likelihood of a realization
(nit, l∗it : t = 0, . . . , T ) could be written as follows:
T∏
t=0
ft(nit|Nit−1, L∗it−1, Qit)f∗t (l∗it|l∗it−1) =
T∏
t=0
exp(−λit)λnitit
nit!
1√
2pi
exp
[
−(l
∗
it − µ∗i l∗it−1)2
2
]
. (A2.3)
However, the L∗iT are not observed. Therefore, we integrate out all latent variables from the likelihood
function, with respect to the assumed normal distribution, to get the marginal density of patent counts.
Since the number of {l∗it : t = 0, . . . , T} is equal to the number of periods observed, the integrated
likelihood function is the following (T + 1)-dimensional integral:
L =
∫
RT+1
T∏
t=0
exp(−λit)λnitit
nit!
1√
2pi
exp
[
−(l
∗
it − µ∗i l∗it−1)2
2
]
dL∗iT . (A2.4)
Rewrite the likelihood of patent counts as follows:
L(NiT , θ) =
∫
RT+1
g(NiT , L∗iT |QiT , θ)dL∗iT =
∫
RT+1
T∏
t=0
gt(nit, l∗it|Nit−1, L∗it−1, Qit, θt)dL∗iT , (A2.5)
where g is the joint density of (NiT , L∗iT ) and θ denotes the vector of parameters of the model.
The major difficulty related to the statistical inference of the model is the precise evaluation of
the (T + 1)-dimensional integral in L for given parameter values. This is performed numerically by
Monte Carlo (MC) simulation method using the EIS technique (Richard and Zhang, 2007). The EIS
procedure is nested into a typical likelihood function maximization procedure. In order to maintain
the stability of that procedure, the same set of i.i.d. N(0, 1) random numbers (i.e., common random
numbers) is used for every set of parameters to estimate the value of the integrated likelihood function
(see Richard and Zhang, 2007).
The EIS methodology consists of the following elements. First, an auxiliary sampler, m is intro-
duced, which is included in the likelihood function. Then, it is factorized into the product of (T + 1)
sequential auxiliary densities, {mt : t = 0, . . . , T} as follows:
L(NiT , θ) =
∫
RT+1
T∏
t=0
gt(nit, l∗it|Nit−1, L∗it−1, Qit, θt)
mt(l∗it|L∗it−1, θ∗t )
×mt(l∗it|L∗it−1, θ∗t )dL∗iT , (A2.6)
where θ∗t denotes the parameters of the i-th auxiliary sampler. Then, the importance MC estimate of
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L(NiT , θ) for given θ∗ is:
LˆR(NiT , θ, θ∗) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
T∏
t=0
gt(nit, l∗itr|Nit−1, L∗it−1r, Qit, θt)
mt(l∗itr|L∗it−1r, θ∗t )
, (A2.7)
where θ∗ is the vector of parameters of the auxiliary sampler defined as the union of all θ∗t s and
{l∗itr : t = 0, . . . , T} denotes the r-th trajectory of i.i.d. draws from {mt : t = 0, . . . , T} and r = 1, . . . , R.
In the application of the EIS method, we use the answers of Richard and Zhang (2007) for the next
two questions related to the sequential auxiliary densities: (a) How to choose the distribution for mt
in order to simulate l∗itr? and (b) How to choose the θ
∗
t parameters of mt?
(a) How to choose the distribution for mt in order to simulate l∗itr? Richard and Zhang (2007)
suggest defining the auxiliary sampler, mt with its associated density kernel, kt:
kt(L∗it, θ
∗
t ) = mt(l
∗
it|L∗it−1, θ∗t )χt(L∗it−1, θ∗t ), (A2.8)
where
χt(L∗it−1, θ
∗
t ) =
∫
R
kt(L∗it, θ
∗
t )dl
∗
it (A2.9)
denotes the t-th integrating constant associated to kt. Richard and Zhang (2007) suggest choosing kt
as a kernel of the normal distribution. Moreover, we include f∗t into the auxiliary sampler, mt, see
Bauwens and Hautsch (2006). Therefore, the t-th normal density kernel has the following form:
kt(L∗it, θ
∗
t ) = exp(θ
∗
1tl
∗
it + θ
∗
2t(l
∗
it)
2)× exp
[
−(l
∗
it − µ∗i l∗it−1)2
2
]
, (A2.10)
where θ∗t = (θ∗1t, θ∗2t) determines the conditional mean and variance of the t-th auxiliary sampler, mt.
Bauwens and Hautsch (2006) show that the conditional mean, µt and conditional variance, pi2t of the
normal auxiliary sampler, mt are given by:
µt = pi2t (θ
∗
1t + µ
∗
i l
∗
it−1), (A2.11)
pi2t =
1
1− 2θ∗2t
. (A2.12)
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Therefore, for given parameters of the auxiliary sampler a trajectory of {l∗it : t = 0, . . . , T} can be
generated from the following AR(1) process:
l∗it = pi
2
t θ
∗
1t + pi
2
t µ
∗
i l
∗
it−1 + pitηit, (A2.13)
where ηit ∼ N(0, 1) are i.i.d. common random numbers.
(b) How to choose the θ∗t parameters of mt? The EIS methodology relies on the optimal choice
of parameters of the auxiliary samplers in the sense that for given m, the variance of LˆR(NiT , θ, θ∗) is
minimized, i.e.:
θ∗(NiT , θ) = argmin
θ∗
V ar[LˆR(NiT , θ, θ∗)]. (A2.14)
From Equation (A2.7), one can see that this variance is ‘small’ if the auxiliary sampler, mit provides
a ‘good fit’ to the gt function. Expressing the auxiliary sampler by its associated density kernel and
integrating constant from (A2.8), mt may provide a ‘good fit’ to gt if
ln gt(nit, l∗it|Nit−1, L∗it−1, Qit, θt) + lnχt(L∗it−1, θ∗it) ' ln kt(L∗it, θ∗t ). (A2.15)
Richard and Zhang (2007) show that if the auxiliary samplers are normal distributions then the MC
variance minimization problem stated in Equation (A2.14) can be reduced to a recursive sequence of
(T + 1) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) problems, each of the following form (see also Bauwens and
Hautsch, 2006):
ln gt(nit, l∗itr|Nit−1, L∗it−1r, Qt, θ) + lnχt+1(L∗itr, θˆ∗t+1) = θ∗t0 + θ∗t1l∗itr + θ∗t2(l∗itr)2 + utr (A2.16)
for t = T, . . . , 0, r = 1, . . . , R, χT+1(L∗iiT , θˆ
∗
T+1) = 1 and θˆ
∗
t+1 is the OLS estimate of θ
∗
t+1. Thus, for
each observation t, one has to compute the OLS estimate of the parameters of the auxiliary sampler,
mt. The regressions have a recursive structure as the θˆ∗t+1 estimates are used to compute the integrating
constant for the next, t-th OLS regression.30 Thus, the regressions are run backwards, i.e. from T
30 This is based on the permutation of the integrating constants in Equation (A2.7), see Richard and Zhang (2007) for
more details.
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to 0. The sample size of each regression is equal to the number of trajectories drawn, R. One of the
advantages of the EIS algorithm is that these auxiliary regressions are typically run with relatively low
sample sizes. In this paper, the number of trajectories of the latent variables is R = 50.
In summary, the EIS technique consists of the following steps:
Step 1: Draw R trajectories {l∗itr}Tt=0 from the natural sampler, N(µl∗it−1r, 1).
Step 2: For each t (from T to 0), estimate the regression in (A2.16).
Step 3: Given the OLS estimates of θ∗ obtained in Step 2, draw R trajectories {l∗itr}Tt=0 from the
auxiliary samplers, {mt}Tt=0. Iterate Steps 2 and 3 five times (Richard and Zhang, 2007).
Step 4: The estimate of the likelihood function, LˆR can be computed as follows. From (A2.8), express
m as:
mt(l∗it|L∗it−1, θ∗t ) =
kt(L∗it, θ
∗
t )
χt(L∗it−1, θ
∗
t )
, (A2.17)
From (A2.10), one may deduce that the t-th integrating constant is given by:
χt(L∗it−1, θ
∗
t ) =
√
2pipi2t × exp
[
−(µ
∗
i )
2(l∗it−1)
2
2
+
µ2t
2pi2t
]
. (A2.18)
Compute the estimation of the likelihood function of formula (A2.7) using formulas (A2.10),
(A2.17) and (A2.18).
Appendix 3: Estimation of the secret patent intensity component
One of the variables of each PVAR market value model is the log latent component of patent innovation
intensity, lnλ∗it. The value of λ
∗
it is estimated by computing the expectation of the latent patent
innovations component conditional on the observable information set, i.e. E[λ∗it|Nit−1, Qt]. In order
to obtain this estimate, all latent variables (l∗t ) are integrated out from the expectation and it can be
computed similarly to Bauwens and Hautsch (2006, pp. 460) as follows:
E[λ∗it|Nit−1, Qt] =
∫
Rt λ
∗
itf
∗
t (l
∗
t |Nit−1, L∗t−1, Qt)g(Nit−1, L∗t−1|Qt−1, θt)dL∗t∫
Rt−1 g(Nit−1, L
∗
t−1|Qt−1, θt)dL∗t−1
, (A3.1)
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where g is the density function of (Nit−1, L∗t−1|Qt−1, θt). Notice that f∗t (l∗t |Nit−1, L∗t−1, Qt) = f∗t (l∗t |l∗t−1).
The high-dimensional integrals in this ratio are approximated numerically by the EIS technique pre-
sented in Appendix 2. Finally, the estimates of E[λ∗it|Nit−1, Qt] are included in the PVAR models as
secret patent innovations variables.
Appendix 4: IRFs and dynamic multipliers of the PVAR models
In this appendix, orthogonalized IRFs and dynamic multipliers of Models 1, 2 and 3 are derived. For all
PVAR models, the IRFs are orthogonalized by applying the (
√
Ω²)−1 matrix, which gives information
on the contemporaneous relationships among the variables corresponding to the non-orthogonalized
IRFs. Using the parameters of the PVAR specification of this paper, (
√
Ω²)−1 is given by
(
√
Ω²)−1 =

1 0 0
−Ωe21 1 0
Ωe21Ωe32 − Ωe31 −Ωe32 1
 . (A4.1)
Model 1 : Multiply Equation (4) by (
√
Ωe)−1 and express Y˜it as follows:
(
√
Ωe)−1Y˜it = (
√
Ωe)−1ai + (
√
Ωe)−1ζY˜it−1 + ²it, (A4.2)
Y˜it = (I3 − ζL)−1
√
Ωe(
√
Ωe)−1ai + (I3 − ζL)−1
√
Ωe²it, (A4.3)
where ²it = (
√
Ωe)−1eit are orthogonal (structural) error terms. Since (I3 − ζL)−1 =
∑∞
j=0 ζ
jLj , then
Y˜it =
∞∑
j=0
ζjai +
∞∑
j=0
ζj
√
Ωe²it−j , (A4.4)
and the IRFs are given by:
Θj = ζj
√
Ωe for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (A4.5)
Model 2 : Multiply Equation (29) by (
√
Ωe)−1 and express Y˜it as follows:
(
√
Ωe)−1Y˜it = (
√
Ωe)−1ai + (
√
Ωe)−1ζY˜it−1 + (
√
Ωe)−1ζILY˜it−1D(i = IL) + ²it, (A4.6)
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Y˜it = {I3 − [ζ + ζILD(i = IL)]L}−1ai + {I3 − [ζ + ζILD(i = IL)]L}−1(
√
Ωe)²it, (A4.7)
where ²it = (
√
Ωe)−1eit are orthogonal error terms.
Since {I3 − [ζ + ζILD(i = IL)]L}−1 =
∑∞
j=0[ζ + ζILD(i = IL)]
jLj , then
Y˜it =
∞∑
j=0
[ζ + ζILD(i = IL)]jai +
∞∑
j=0
[ζ + ζILD(i = IL)]j(
√
Ωe)²it−j , (A4.8)
and the IRFs are given by:
Θij(IL) = (ζ + ζIL)j
√
Ωe for i = IL and j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞, (A4.9)
Θij(IF) = ζj
√
Ωe for i ∈ IF and j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (A4.10)
Model 3 : Multiply Equation (36) by (
√
Ωe)−1 and express Y˜it as follows:
(
√
Ωe)−1Y˜it = (
√
Ωe)−1ai + (
√
Ωe)−1ζY˜it−1 + (
√
Ωe)−1ζILY˜ILt−1D(i ∈ IF)+ (A4.11)
+(
√
Ωe)−1
(∑
k∈IF
ζIFY˜kt−1
)
D(i = IL) + ²it,
Y˜it = (I3 − ζL)−1ai + (I3 − ζL)−1ζILY˜ILt−1D(i ∈ IF)+ (A4.12)
+(I3 − ζL)−1
(∑
k∈IF
ζIFY˜kt−1
)
D(i = IL) + (I3 − ζL)−1(
√
Ωe)²it,
where ²it = (
√
Ωe)−1eit are orthogonal (structural) error terms. Since (I3 − ζL)−1 =
∑∞
j=0 ζ
jLj , then
Y˜it =
∞∑
j=0
ζjai +
∞∑
j=0
ζjζILY˜ILt−1−jD(i ∈ IF)+ (A4.13)
+
∞∑
j=0
∑
k∈IF
ζjζIFY˜kt−1−jD(i = IL) +
∞∑
j=0
ζj(
√
Ωe)²it−j ,
and the IRFs are given by:
Θj = ζj
√
Ωe for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (A4.14)
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Moreover, the dynamic interaction multipliers are given by:
Γj(IL→ IF) = (Effects of Y˜ILt−j on Y˜it for i ∈ IF) = ζjζIL for j = 1, 2, . . . ,∞, (A4.15)
Γj(IF→ IL) = (Effects of Y˜kt−j for k ∈ IF on Y˜ILt) = ζjζIF for j = 1, 2, . . . ,∞. (A4.16)
Data sources
Center for Research on Stock Prices (CRSP) accessed from the Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS).
Compustat (North America) Database. Standard & Poor’s, 2005.
Consumer price index for all urban consumers. U.S. Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics, data downloaded
from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis website (available at: http://research.stlouisfed.org).
MicroPatents Co., US Utility Patent Database covering the period 1979 to 2004 and US patent citations for years 2003
and 2004.
National Bureau of Economic Research Patent Citations Data-File. CD-ROM included in: Jaffe, A. B., M. Trajtenberg
(Eds.), Patents, Citations, and Innovations: A Window on the Knowledge Economy, MIT Press, 2002.
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Table 1. SIC based industry diversification in the technological cluster
SIC industry name SIC No. firms
Pharmaceutical preparations 2834 47
Biological products (no diagnostic substances) 2836 31
In vitro & in vivo diagnostic substances 2835 7
Perfumes, cosmetics & other toilet preparations 2844 3
Surgical & medical instruments & apparatus 3841 3
Medicinal chemicals & botanical products 2833 2
Wholesale-drugs, proprietaries & druggists’ sundries 5122 2
Services-medical laboratories 8071 2
Grain mill products 2040 1
Beverages 2080 1
Chemicals & allied products 2800 1
Soap, detergents, cleaning preparations, perfumes, cosmetics 2840 1
Paints, varnishes, lacquers, enamels & allied prods 2851 1
Agricultural chemicals 2870 1
Plastics products, NEC 3089 1
Electromedical & electrotherapeutic apparatus 3845 1
Wholesale-medical, dental & hospital equipment & supplies 5047 1
Fire, marine & casualty insurance 6331 1
Services-hospitals 8060 1
Services-engineering, accounting, research, management 8700 1
Services-commercial physical & biological research 8731 1
Non-operating establishments 9995 1
Total number of firms 111
Notes: Standard Industry Classification (SIC).
Table 2. Hall and Mairesse (HM, 1996) based industry diversification in the technological cluster
HM industry name No. firms
Pharmaceuticals 92
Non-manufacturing 10
Computers and inst. 4
Chemicals 2
Food 2
Rubber and plastics 1
Total number of firms 111
44
Table 3. Patent innovations leadership classification of firms based on mean values from 1979 to 2000
Firm name (SIC) Cluster (V1) (V2) (V3) (V4) (V5) (V6) (V7) (V8) (V9)
1. Merck & Co. (2834) IL 217.6 1367.5 136.7 147232.4 12.39 8.47 13.20 0.82 1.16
2. Eli Lilly and Co. (2834) IF 116.0 613.6 58.6 43645.5 12.21 8.15 12.69 0.83 1.17
3. Abbott Laboratories (2834) IF 97.5 720.8 73.9 40954.3 11.89 7.91 12.67 0.80 1.13
4. Warner-Lambert (2834) IF 81.7 656.2 61.3 31542.0 10.64 7.23 10.55 0.75 1.29
5. Pfizer, Inc. (2834) IF 103.0 553.2 49.1 23373.0 12.21 8.32 12.79 0.81 1.16
6. Bristol-Myers Sq. (2834) IF 69.7 307.4 34.2 11509.1 12.11 8.27 12.95 0.80 1.14
7. American Home (2834) IF 52.8 330.7 30.7 8396.9 10.82 8.05 11.38 0.72 1.25
8. Alza Co. (2834) IF 35.5 547.6 40.9 7683.0 8.24 5.28 9.92 0.78 1.01
9. Mallinckrodt, Inc. (2835) IF 23.5 181.9 16.9 2007.8 9.25 6.92 9.82 0.68 1.11
10. Pharmacia & Upj. (2834) IF 21.4 45.9 8.5 1922.6 10.96 7.45 10.34 0.79 1.34
11. Church & Dwight (2840) IF 12.3 83.4 9.9 1537.8 7.96 5.10 9.74 0.66 0.89
12. NeoRx Co. (2835) IF 6.5 68.4 7.8 500.5 7.25 4.12 7.92 1.07 0.96
13. Alliance Pharma. (2834) IF 4.2 69.9 6.9 369.8 7.42 4.33 8.83 1.06 0.87
14. Xoma Co. (2836) IF 6.9 48.7 5.0 329.6 8.11 4.21 8.84 1.15 0.96
15. Enzon, Inc. (2836) IF 4.2 47.1 6.0 235.9 6.95 4.13 8.79 1.08 0.83
16. Guilford Pharma. (2834) IF 3.5 23.0 4.9 216.5 6.75 4.20 6.98 0.98 1.01
17. Sugen, Inc. (2836) IF 4.4 23.8 4.0 216.2 6.50 4.02 6.42 0.95 1.05
18. Inhale Therapeutic (2834) IF 2.5 31.3 7.0 169.3 6.33 4.17 7.15 0.92 0.97
19. Corvas, Inc. (2836) IF 3.5 16.3 2.1 122.5 6.58 4.07 7.00 1.00 1.00
20. Molecular Biosyst. (2835) IF 2.0 57.5 4.8 90.5 6.97 4.23 7.97 1.02 0.93
Notes: Standard Industry Classification (SIC). Innovation Leader (IL). Innovation Follower (IF). The table presents nine
variables for 20 out of the 111 firms of the technological cluster analyzed for the period 1979 to 2000. The mean, over the
period 1979 to 2000, of the following variables is presented:
(V1) patent applications count: nit
(V2) forward citations received count: cfit
(V3) forward citations received count corrected for sample truncation bias (see Hall et al, 2001): c˜fit
(V4) knowledge stock:
∑t
s=0 c˜fisnis(1− δ)t−s
(v5) log R&D expenses: rit
(V6) log book value: zit
(V7) log stock market value: mit
(V8) log R&D expenses to log sales: rit/sit
(V9) log R&D expenses to log stock market value: rit/mit
Firms are ranked according to the mean of (V4). The companies not presented in the table from the technological cluster
are assigned to the IF cluster. For seven out of the nine variables considered, Merck is the leader. Table 4 and Figure 2
show that this leadership is preserved for the whole period. We, therefore, call Merck the permanent IL. The rest of the
firms from the technological cluster are the permanent IFs.
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Table 4. Evolution of the knowledge stock for some firms of the technological cluster
Merck & Eli Lilly Abbott Warner- Pfizer, Bristol- American Alza Mallinckrodt
Co., Inc. and Co. Laborat. Lambert Inc. Myers Home Co. Spec. Chem.
Year Co. Squibb Products Co., Inc.
1979 31,215 4,269 4,467 571 4,804 778 1,087 1,049 233
1980 51,807 13,245 6,246 1,411 6,131 1,237 2,269 2,805 331
1981 65,132 21,253 6,629 3,498 7,800 1,679 3,108 3,014 558
1982 73,959 21,034 7,164 4,159 8,658 1,739 3,135 3,681 621
1983 79,546 22,916 7,026 8,318 9,752 2,061 3,422 3,815 795
1984 83,616 25,138 6,928 16,406 11,298 2,521 3,433 4,806 925
1985 89,006 25,415 6,517 30,040 16,978 3,292 3,961 5,523 1,197
1986 97,238 23,248 7,754 43,104 18,579 3,694 5,771 6,628 1,358
1987 110,944 20,924 9,491 46,594 20,046 4,022 7,457 7,599 1,627
1988 108,461 19,228 12,499 50,251 24,377 4,988 7,516 9,036 1,789
1989 115,519 18,659 22,947 51,266 24,662 5,125 8,781 8,867 1,888
1990 136,414 18,617 28,476 52,747 29,798 6,483 8,892 9,472 2,513
1991 168,611 18,200 41,039 48,972 29,716 6,086 12,374 10,247 2,492
1992 204,970 20,146 50,468 44,339 31,188 8,039 13,667 11,131 3,480
1993 201,721 33,182 59,326 43,195 29,225 13,129 12,963 10,693 3,525
1994 213,937 46,093 70,367 41,515 31,009 15,414 14,425 10,754 3,321
1995 224,626 125,948 103,236 42,818 31,387 22,760 14,590 11,092 3,312
1996 233,309 112,243 100,738 37,540 29,102 26,825 13,133 9,837 3,078
1997 246,212 108,158 100,803 34,863 31,735 28,880 11,966 10,861 2,689
1998 248,862 98,847 91,705 33,734 30,075 30,646 10,735 10,660 2,298
1999 235,728 86,997 83,547 31,169 42,459 32,501 10,286 9,403 2,475
2000 218,279 76,439 73,621 27,414 45,426 31,301 11,762 8,054 3,667
Notes: The table presents the knowledge stock for nine firms presented in Table 3. These firms have the highest ranking
in the technological cluster according to the mean knowledge stock. The table shows that the knowledge stock of Merck,
indicated by bold numbers, was permanently higher than that of other firms in the technological cluster in every year.
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Table 5. Cross-correlation matrices among innovation variables, firm size and market value
V 1t V 2t V 3t V 4t V 5t V 6t V 7t V 8t V 9t
V 1t−1 0.89 0.72 0.81 0.86 0.60 0.70 0.48 -0.09 0.03
V 2t−1 0.81 0.90 0.88 0.71 0.58 0.64 0.40 -0.08 0.11
V 3t−1 0.88 0.84 0.89 0.82 0.60 0.68 0.46 -0.09 0.06
V 4t−1 0.79 0.55 0.69 0.95 0.43 0.51 0.38 -0.06 -0.04
V 5t−1 0.62 0.55 0.60 0.46 0.90 0.77 0.67 0.03 0.06
V 6t−1 0.72 0.59 0.66 0.54 0.73 0.91 0.62 -0.19 0.02
V 7t−1 0.48 0.33 0.42 0.39 0.60 0.61 0.85 -0.08 -0.47
V 8t−1 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.08 -0.18 -0.01 0.54 0.03
V 9t−1 0.05 0.18 0.11 -0.01 0.15 0.06 -0.41 0.08 0.73
V 1t V 2t V 3t V 4t V 5t V 6t V 7t V 8t V 9t
V 1t 1.00
V 2t 0.82 1.00
V 3t 0.93 0.95 1.00
V 4t 0.88 0.64 0.78 1.00
V 5t 0.64 0.57 0.62 0.47 1.00
V 6t 0.74 0.62 0.68 0.55 0.79 1.00
V 7t 0.50 0.36 0.45 0.41 0.68 0.67 1.00
V 8t -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 0.11 -0.20 -0.04 1.00
V 9t 0.04 0.15 0.09 -0.03 0.15 0.01 -0.59 0.09 1.00
V 1t V 2t V 3t V 4t V 5t V 6t V 7t V 8t V 9t
V 1t+1 0.89 0.81 0.88 0.79 0.62 0.72 0.48 -0.09 0.05
V 2t+1 0.71 0.90 0.84 0.55 0.55 0.59 0.33 -0.08 0.18
V 3t+1 0.81 0.88 0.89 0.69 0.60 0.66 0.42 -0.08 0.10
V 4t+1 0.86 0.71 0.82 0.95 0.46 0.54 0.39 -0.06 -0.01
V 5t+1 0.60 0.58 0.60 0.43 0.90 0.73 0.60 0.08 0.15
V 6t+1 0.70 0.64 0.68 0.52 0.77 0.91 0.61 -0.18 0.06
V 7t+1 0.48 0.40 0.46 0.38 0.68 0.62 0.85 -0.01 -0.41
V 8t+1 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 0.04 -0.19 -0.08 0.54 0.09
V 9t+1 0.02 0.11 0.06 -0.04 0.05 0.02 -0.47 0.03 0.73
Notes: The cross-correlation coefficients are computed for the 111 firms of the technological cluster, for the period 1979
to 2000, among the variables (V1)-(V9) presented in Table 3. The bold numbers correspond to the (V4) knowledge stock
variable.
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Table 6. Ranking of firms with respect to the predictive absorptive capacity and mean log market value
Ranking Firm name 1/σˆi Ranking Firm name (1/T )
∑T
t=1mit
1 Merck & Co., Inc. 8.80 1 Merck & Co., Inc. 7.90
2 Cypress Bioscience, Inc. 8.42 2 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 7.65
3 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. 6.26 3 Pfizer, Inc. 7.49
4 Pfizer, Inc. 5.91 4 Eli Lilly and Co. 7.39
5 Alza Co. 5.83 5 Abbott Laboratories 7.37
6 Block Drug Co., Inc. 5.80 6 Warner-Lambert Co. 5.25
7 Interferon Sciences, Inc. 4.49 7 Pharmacia & Upjohn AB 5.04
8 Warner-Lambert Co. 4.12 8 Alza Co. 4.62
9 Mallinckrodt Co., Inc. 4.07 9 Mallinckrodt Co., Inc. 4.52
10 Abbott Laboratories 3.69 10 Church & Dwight Co., Inc. 4.45
11 Vical, Inc. 3.30 11 Block Drug Co., Inc. 3.64
12 Cytogen Co. 3.07 12 Xoma Co. 3.54
13 Xoma Co. 2.92 13 Alliance Pharma. Co. 3.53
14 NeoRx Co. 2.78 14 Enzon, Inc. 3.50
15 Eli Lilly and Co. 2.77 15 Cytogen Co. 3.32
16 Pharmacia & Upjohn AB 2.67 16 MedImmune, Inc. 3.01
17 Vion Pharma., Inc. 2.65 17 Chattem, Inc. 2.98
18 Enzon, Inc. 2.01 18 Scios, Inc. 2.96
19 Biomatrix, Inc. 2.00 19 Cypress Bioscience, Inc. 2.70
20 NPS Pharma., Inc. 1.86 20 IDEC Pharma. Co. 2.69
21 Shaman Pharma., Inc. 1.81 21 NeoRx Co. 2.62
22 Valentis, Inc. 1.74 22 The Immune Response Co. 2.51
23 Alliance Pharma. Co. 1.72 23 Agouron Pharma., Inc. 2.41
24 Quigley Company, Inc. 1.68 24 Interferon Sciences, Inc. 2.37
25 Scios, Inc. 1.66 25 Biomatrix, Inc. 2.10
26 Zonagen, Inc. 1.65 26 Vical, Inc. 1.97
27 Celtrix Pharma., Inc. 1.63 27 Biospherics, Inc. 1.86
28 MedImmune, Inc. 1.56 28 Immulogic Pharma. Co. 1.84
29 Magainin Pharma., Inc. 1.51 29 Cytel, Inc. 1.82
30 The Immune Response Co. 1.50 30 Magainin Pharma., Inc. 1.82
Notes: For the firms presented in the table, σi is significant at the 5% level. For the firms excluded from the table, σi is
not significant at the 5% level.
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Table 7. Parameter estimates of Model 1: benchmark model
Mean equation
γ′ yit lnλoit lnλ
∗
it
ω′ -0.10 0.47 -0.10
t 0.02 0.46 0.18
yt 0.72 0.09 0.05
zit -0.15 0.02 -0.06
rit−1
mit−1 3.15 0.05 -0.15
PVAR(1) effects (Mζ = 0.93)
ζ′ y˜it ln λ˜oit ln λ˜
∗
it
y˜it−1 0.04 0.01 0.03
ln λ˜oit−1 0.19 0.22 0.21
ln λ˜∗it−1 0.70 0.70 0.70
Covariance effects
Ωe Ωey Ωeo Ωe∗
Ωey 1.00 -0.20 0.36
Ωeo -0.20 1.04 0.37
Ωe∗ 0.36 0.37 1.32
Matrix of orthogonalization
(
√
Ωe)
−1 Ωey Ωeo Ωe∗
Ωey 1.00 0.00 0.00
Ωeo 0.20 1.00 0.00
Ωe∗ -0.45 -0.44 1.00
Long-run impact matrix
Θj(1)
′ y˜it ln λ˜oit ln λ˜
∗
it
²yit−j 4.76 3.52 4.14
²oit−j 8.25 9.28 8.79
²∗it−j 11.08 11.08 12.19
Notes: Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR). Bold numbers denote parameter significance at the 5 percent level. The Mζ
denotes the maximum modulus of the eigenvalues of ζ.
Model 1. Benchmark market value model:
Yit = γXit + Y˜it = ω + ρt+ βyt + ψzit + φ
rit−1
mit−1
+ Y˜it
Y˜it = ai + ζY˜it−1 + eit
The estimates of Ω0 and Ωa and are not reported in the table. The second equation is orthogonalized by multiplying each
term by (
√
Ωe)
−1, which gives the next expression:
(
√
Ωe)
−1
 y˜itln λ˜oit
ln λ˜∗it
 = (√Ωe)−1
 ayiaoi
a∗i
+ (√Ωe)−1
 ζ11 ζ12 ζ13ζ21 ζ22 ζ23
ζ31 ζ32 ζ33
 y˜it−1ln λ˜oit−1
ln λ˜∗it−1
+
 ²yit²oit
²∗it

where ²it = (²yit, ²oit, ²∗it)′ = (
√
Ωe)
−1eit are orthogonal (structural) error terms. According to the estimates of (
√
Ωe)
−1,
the left hand side of the previous equation is 1.00 0.00 0.000.20 1.00 0.00
−0.45 −0.44 1.00
 y˜itln λ˜oit
ln λ˜∗it
 =
 y˜it0.20y˜it + ln λ˜oit
−0.45y˜it − 0.44 ln λ˜oit + ln λ˜∗it

Therefore, the contemporaneous relationships are indicated by the first term of the right hand side of the following
equation: y˜itln λ˜oit
ln λ˜∗it
 =
 0.00−0.20y˜it
0.45y˜it + 0.44 ln λ˜
o
it
+
 ayi0.20ayi + aoi
−0.45ayi − 0.44aoi + a∗i
+
+
 0.04y˜it−1 + 0.19 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.70 ln λ˜∗it−10.02y˜it−1 + 0.26 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.84 ln λ˜∗it−1
0.01y˜it−1 + 0.03 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.08 ln λ˜
∗
it−1
+
 ²yit²oit
²∗it
 .
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Table 8. Parameter estimates of Model 2: differential effects of the permanent IL
Mean equation (IF effects)
γ′ yit lnλoit lnλ
∗
it
ω′ -0.10 0.44 -0.13
t 0.02 0.46 0.18
yt 0.72 0.09 0.05
zit -0.12 0.05 -0.02
rit−1
mit−1 3.19 0.03 -0.14
Mean equation (IL effects)
γ′IL yit lnλ
o
it lnλ
∗
it
ω′IL 0.54 3.60 1.65
t -0.01 -0.05 0.05
yt 0.00 0.09 0.10
zit 0.12 0.01 0.05
rit−1
mit−1 -0.59 0.01 -0.01
PVAR(1) effects of IF (Mζ = 0.93)
ζ′ y˜it ln λ˜oit ln λ˜
∗
it
y˜it−1 0.04 0.01 0.02
ln λ˜oit−1 0.20 0.22 0.21
ln λ˜∗it−1 0.70 0.70 0.70
PVAR(1) effects of IL (MIL = 0.62)
(ζ′ + ζ′IL) y˜it ln λ˜
o
it ln λ˜
∗
it
y˜it−1 0.23 0.06 0.10
ln λ˜oit−1 0.21 0.07 0.11
ln λ˜∗it−1 0.67 0.23 0.34
Covariance effects
Ωe Ωey Ωeo Ωe∗
Ωey 1.00 -0.36 0.35
Ωeo -0.36 1.13 0.31
Ωe∗ 0.35 0.31 1.31
Matrix of orthogonalization
(
√
Ωe)
−1 Ωey Ωeo Ωe∗
Ωey 1.00 0.00 0.00
Ωeo 0.36 1.00 0.00
Ωe∗ -0.51 -0.44 1.00
Long-run impact matrix (IF)
Θij(1)
′ y˜it ln λ˜oit ln λ˜
∗
it
²yit−j 3.73 2.30 3.03
²oit−j 7.47 8.42 7.84
²∗it−j 10.12 10.01 11.01
Long-run impact matrix (IL)
Θij(1)
′ y˜it ln λ˜oit ln λ˜
∗
it
²yit−j 2.00 -0.05 0.82
²oit−j 1.35 1.44 1.10
²∗it−j 1.80 0.58 1.88
Notes: Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR). Innovation Leader (IL). Innovation Follower (IF). Bold numbers denote
parameter significance at the 5 percent level. The Mζ and MIL denote the maximum modulus of the eigenvalues of ζ and
(ζ + ζIL), respectively.
Model 2. Differential effects of the permanent IL:
Yit = γXit+γILXitD(i = IL)+ Y˜it = ω+ δt+βyt+ψzit+φ
rit−1
mit−1
+(ωIL+ δILt+βILyt+ψILzit+φIL
rit−1
mit−1
)Di+ Y˜it
Y˜it = ai + ζY˜it−1 + ζILY˜it−1Di + eit
where Di = 1 if i = IL and zero otherwise. The estimates of Ω0 and Ωa and are not reported in the table. The
contemporaneous relationships are indicated by the first term of the right hand side of the following equation: y˜itln λ˜oit
ln λ˜∗it
 =
 0.00−0.36y˜it
0.51y˜it + 0.44 ln λ˜
o
it
+
 ayi0.36ayi + aoi
−0.51ayi − 0.44aoi + a∗i
+
+
 0.04y˜it−1 + 0.20 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.70 ln λ˜∗it−10.02y˜it−1 + 0.29 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.95 ln λ˜∗it−1
0.01 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.03 ln λ˜
∗
it−1
+
 0.19y˜it−1 + 0.01 ln λ˜oit−1 − 0.03 ln λ˜∗it−10.12y˜it−1 − 0.15 ln λ˜oit−1 − 0.48 ln λ˜∗it−1
−0.04y˜it−1 − 0.04 ln λ˜oit−1 − 0.14 ln λ˜∗it−1
Di +
 ²yit²oit
²∗it
 .
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Table 9. Parameter estimates of Model 3: dynamic interaction between IL and IF
Mean equation
γ′ yit lnλoit lnλ
∗
it
ω′ -0.12 0.36 0.13
t 0.03 0.46 0.19
yt 0.71 0.10 0.05
zit -0.14 0.06 -0.04
rit−1
mit−1 3.20 0.03 -0.13
PVAR(1) effects (Mζ = 0.93)
ζ′ y˜it ln λ˜oit ln λ˜
∗
it
y˜it−1 0.04 0.01 0.03
ln λ˜oit−1 0.19 0.22 0.21
ln λ˜∗it−1 0.70 0.70 0.70
Dynamic effects of IL on IFs
ζ′IL y˜IFt ln λ˜
o
IFt ln λ˜
∗
IFt
y˜ILt−1 -0.07 -0.10 0.04
ln λ˜oILt−1 -0.02 -0.03 0.02
ln λ˜∗ILt−1 0.12 0.19 -0.10
Dynamic effects of IFs on IL
ζ′IF y˜ILt ln λ˜
o
ILt ln λ˜
∗
ILt
y˜IFt−1 -0.14 0.05 -0.02
ln λ˜oIFt−1 0.06 -0.01 0.01
ln λ˜∗IFt−1 0.06 -0.02 0.00
Covariance effects
Ωe Ωey Ωeo Ωe∗
Ωey 1.00 -0.39 0.36
Ωeo -0.39 1.15 0.30
Ωe∗ 0.36 0.30 1.33
Matrix of orthogonalization
(
√
Ωe)
−1 Ωey Ωeo Ωe∗
Ωey 1.00 0.00 0.00
Ωeo 0.39 1.00 0.00
Ωe∗ -0.53 -0.44 1.00
Long-run impact matrix
Θj(1)
′ y˜it ln λ˜oit ln λ˜
∗
it
²yit−j 4.12 2.69 3.49
²oit−j 8.23 9.26 8.78
²∗it−j 11.14 11.14 12.26
Notes: Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR). Innovation Leader (IL). Innovation Follower (IF). Bold numbers denote
parameter significance at the 5 percent level. The Mζ denotes the maximum modulus of the eigenvalues of ζ.
Model 3. Interactions between the innovation permanent IL and the IFs:
Yit = γXit + Y˜it = ω + δt+ βyit + ψzit + φ
rit−1
mit−1
+ Y˜it
Y˜it = ai + ζY˜it−1 +D(i ∈ IF)ζILY˜ILt−1 +D(i = IL)
∑
k∈IF
ζIFY˜kt−1 + eit
The estimates of Ω0 and Ωa and are not reported in the table. The contemporaneous relationships are indicated by the
first term of the right hand side of the following equation: y˜itln λ˜oit
ln λ˜∗it
 =
 0.00−0.39y˜it
0.53y˜it + 0.44 ln λ˜
o
it
+
 ayi0.39ayi + aoi
−0.53ayi − 0.44aoi + a∗i
+
+
 0.04y˜it−1 + 0.19 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.70 ln λ˜∗it−10.03y˜it−1 + 0.29 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.97 ln λ˜∗it−1
0.01 ln λ˜oit−1 + 0.02 ln λ˜
∗
it−1
+D(i ∈ IF)
 −0.70y˜ILt−1 − 0.02 ln λ˜oILt−1 + 0.12 ln λ˜∗ILt−1−0.10y˜ILt−1 − 0.03 ln λ˜oILt−1 + 0.19 ln λ˜∗ILt−1
0.04y˜ILt−1 + 0.02 ln λ˜oILt−1 − 0.10 ln λ˜∗ILt−1
+
+D(i = IL)
∑
k∈IF
 −0.14y˜kt−1 + 0.06 ln λ˜okt−1 + 0.06 ln λ˜∗kt−10.05y˜kt−1 − 0.01 ln λ˜okt−1 − 0.02 ln λ˜∗kt−1
−0.02y˜kt−1 + 0.01 ln λ˜okt−1
+
 ²yit²oit
²∗it
 .
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Figure 1. Evolution of total patent application counts and total patent application intensity estimates of firms in the
technological cluster over the period 1979 to 2000.
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of
∑N
i=1 nit and
∑N
i=1 λˆit.
Figure 2. Evolution of the patent application counts and knowledge stock per firm for permanent IL (Merck) and
permanent IFs over the period 1979 to 2000.
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Figure 3. Evolution of mean observable and mean latent components of patent intensity of firms in the technological
cluster over the period 1979 to 2000.
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of (1/N)
∑N
i=1 λˆ
o
it and (1/N)
∑N
i=1 λˆ
∗
it.
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Figure 4. Estimates of predictive absorptive capacity, 1/σi as a function of different variables.
Notes: The figure shows the predictive absorptive capacity, 1/σi for 60 of the 111 firms in the technological cluster for the
cases, where the σi parameter is significant at the 5% level. See the list of these firms in Table 5. The 1/σi is presented
as a function of the variables (V1)-(V7) and the mean annual stock return. See the definitions of the variables (V1)-(V7)
in the notes of Table 3.
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Model 1: IRF of all firms Model 2: IRF of the IL
Figure 5. IRF of all firms and IRF of the IL firm in Models 1 and 2, respectively, for j = 1, . . . , 15 leads.
Notes: Impulse Response Function (IRF). Innovation Leader (IL). Θ represents the IRF in Model 1. Θ(IL) represents
the IRF of the IL firm in Model 2. The 95% confidence bands are also presented in the figure. ²it = (²yit, ²oit, ²∗it)′ =
(
√
Ωe)
−1eit are orthogonal (structural) error terms.
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Model 3: Impact of the IL on IFs Model 3: Impact of IFs on the IL
Figure 6. Dynamic multipliers of Model 3 for j = 1, . . . , 15 leads.
Notes: Innovation Leader (IL). Innovation Follower (IF). Γ(IL → IF) represents the dynamic interaction of the IL on IF
firms. Γ(IF→ IL) represents the dynamic interactions of IF firms on the IL. The 95% confidence bands are also presented
in the figure.
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